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A foundational question in every dispute over intellectual property is whether the 
defendant’s product is too similar to the plaintiff ’s. For almost all intellectual property 
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regimes, an extensive body of case law and academic commentary has examined how 
such similarity should be measured. Trade secrecy, however, remains a remarkable 
exception. In trade secrecy cases, just as in other intellectual property cases, the 
defendant’s good or method can diverge markedly from what the plaintiff developed. 
Yet it turns out that trade secret case law provides little guidance for assessing how 
much similarity is too much. The standard remains, fittingly but frustratingly, a secret. 
This Article takes the first close look at what that standard should be. We argue 
that trade secrecy’s similarity framework is currently asking an incomplete set of 
questions. It inquires almost exclusively into the defendant’s innovation steps, 
instructing factfinders to determine whether the defendant had acquired any 
advantage from familiarity with the secret. In doing so, it wrongly skips over an 
inquiry into the end product or process that the defendant is actually exploiting. A 
better test would consider not only the defendant’s benefit from knowing the secret, but 
also the kind of exploitable asset that the benefit ultimately translates into. Under our 
proposal, claims for misappropriation through either improper acquisition or disclosure 
would remain largely the same. But misappropriation through use would change. A 
defendant wouldn’t be liable for using a lawfully acquired secret unless it is exploiting 
an asset that incorporates material elements from the owner’s secret in a manner that 
the plaintiff actually foresaw or, given industry trends, could reasonably have foreseen. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of 
infringement. 
—Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.1 
Liability for appropriating intellectual property (IP) usually does not 
require identical copies. All it takes is a sufficient degree of similarity between 
the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s products. One of IP policy’s core questions is 
figuring out where to draw that line of sufficiency.2 How similar, in other 
words, is too similar? 
For almost all IP regimes, an extensive body of case law has attempted 
answers, and an equally extensive volume of academic commentary has offered 
critiques.3 Yet there remains a remarkable exception: trade secrecy. In trade 
secrecy cases, just as in other IP cases, a defendant’s protected information (be 
it software code, a chemical formula, or a manufacturing process) can diverge 
from the one that the plaintiff developed. Often, a plaintiff ’s employee or 
business associate acquired that information lawfully but then left to start a 
different venture, modifying it into something new. Adaptation seems to occur 
at least as often as verbatim duplication. Indeed, a leading treatise in this area 
notes that “[m]ost misappropriation consists of some rather indirect exploitation 
of the owner’s information” rather than a mere slavish copy and paste.4 
Given such exploitation’s frequency, courts should know how to think about 
it. Our claim in this Article is that they don’t. In theory, some derivative uses 
are supposed to lie beyond the trade secret owner’s control. Courts like to 
repeat the maxim that only those uses that qualify as “substantial” constitute 
actionable misappropriation.5 But no one really seems to know what that term 
means. Without ever acknowledging it, courts have veered between cursory 
 
1 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
2 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2014) (“A principal question in IP infringement disputes is whether the 
defendant’s product (or work, or brand, or idea) is too similar in some respect to the plaintiff ’s.”). 
3 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (trademark); Fromer & Lemley, supra note 2 (copyright, patent, and 
trademark); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 989 (1997) (patent and copyright); Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral 
Copyright Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821 (2013) (copyright). 
4 JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 6.03[3] (2018 ed.). It further notes that Justice Jackson’s 
observation on the dullness of patent infringement through outright duplication, quoted in this 
Article’s epigraph, “applies equally to trade secrets.” Id. 
5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) 
(observing that while “improvements or modifications” to a trade secret can qualify as actionable 
misappropriation “if the result is substantially derived from the trade secret,” an actor is not liable 
“if the contribution made by the trade secret is so slight that the actor’s product or process can be 
said to derive from other sources of information or from independent creation”). 
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analogies to copyright law on the one hand and to patent law on the other. This 
doctrinal scavenging obscures more than it clarifies. The standard for actionable 
similarity in trade secrecy cases remains, fittingly but frustratingly, a secret. 
Unfortunately, the upshot in many decisions is that essentially any use counts 
as substantial. The case law seldom investigates whether the copied information 
was a significant part of the plaintiff ’s entitlement or whether the defendant’s 
use poses any threat of market harm. Instead, the test quickly collapses into a 
binary question of whether exposure to the secret educated the defendant at all, 
regardless of what the defendant’s final product or process ends up looking like.6 
That test is hopelessly overbroad. To start, in cases where the defendant 
acquired the information lawfully rather than through a wrongful act, it seems 
to give a windfall to owners. IP policy generally tries to avoid restrictions on 
downstream use that don’t confer offsetting benefits to society. But such 
restrictions are especially pernicious in trade secrecy. In other areas of IP like 
copyright and patent, second comers can usually design around an upstream 
owner’s entitlement by turning to a substitute.7 A filmmaker unable to license a 
song can use a different song; a smartphone producer unable to license a chip 
can use a different chip. But under courts’ current approach to similarity in trade 
secrecy, it’s virtually impossible for a departing employee to find a substitute. 
You can’t erase a secret once you know it. If that secret would provide a boost 
during R&D—even one that leads to a good or method radically different than 
the one embodying the plaintiff ’s secret—the employee’s best alternative isn’t a 
substitute component but to abandon the line of research altogether. As one 
judge recently quipped in a headline-grabbing lawsuit between Uber and 
Google-spinoff Waymo over driverless car technology, “Is an engineer supposed 
to get a frontal lobotomy before they go on to the next job?”8 
 
6 See id. § 40 reporters’ note (“Even if the defendant’s final product or process differs 
significantly from that of the plaintiff, substantial use of the trade secret in the course of the 
defendant’s research can be sufficient to constitute an appropriation.”). 
7 The major IP subfield missing from our discussion is trademark law. We don’t focus on it because, 
unlike the other regimes that center on promoting innovation and creativity, trademarks’ traditional 
purpose is reducing consumer confusion. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 
23, 28-29 (2001); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 223 
n.20 (2d Cir. 2012); Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 65 (2007) 
(“Unlike copyright and patent law, trademark law is not designed to offer the trademark holder incentives 
to create . . . . Rather, trademark law is typically justified in terms of . . . protecting consumers from 
deception in the marketplace by prohibiting the use of source-identifying marks if such use is likely to 
confuse consumers as to the source of the product.”). 
8 Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Jan. 30, 
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-change [https://perma.cc/
GT7Z-PL56] (quoting Judge Alsup’s colloquy with the parties). The case settled in the middle of trial. 
Russ Mitchell & Tracey Lien, Uber Reaches Settlement with Waymo in Dispute over Trade Secrets, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2018, 8:20 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-uber-waymo-settlement-
20180209-story.html [https://perma.cc/4LX6-2L8A]. 
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The inattention to a similarity standard is all the more surprising given trade 
secrecy’s exponentially increasing stakes. Trade secrecy was once a decentralized 
product of individual states’ common law. It’s now a major IP scheme. Almost 
all states have implemented a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA),9 and as of Congress’s enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 
2016 (DTSA), plaintiffs can pursue a claim under federal law as well.10 The 
DTSA’s passage has been called “the most significant expansion of federal law 
in intellectual property” since the 1940s.11 The executive branch, for its part, has 
also been ramping up enforcement of criminal laws against misappropriation, 
from a few cases a year in the late 1990s to hundreds over the last decade.12 
Trade secrecy law’s growing supply meets an equally growing demand. One 
2014 study, cited in the Senate Report accompanying the DTSA, pegged the 
current cost of trade secret misappropriation at somewhere between one and 
three percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.13 Even before the DTSA’s 
enactment, trade secret litigation had been growing rapidly in both state and 
federal court.14 A recent analysis found that between 2001 and 2012, the number 
of trade secret cases adjudicated in federal court grew fourteen percent each 
year.15 Consistent with these litigation rates, survey evidence confirms that 
trade secrecy is an enormously popular form of intellectual property protection 
among firms.16 Trade secrets, unlike patents, arise by operation of law and are 
 
9 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
10 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. The DTSA amends 
the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 to provide a federal cause of action for trade secret 
misappropriation. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012). Before the DTSA, civil trade secret claims were the 
exclusive province of state laws, while federal law provided only criminal penalties. 
11 Letter from Eric Goldman, Professor, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. Of Law, et al., to Charles E. 
Grassley, Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 1890, H.R. 3326) (Nov. 17, 2015) (available at 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%20Opposition%20to%
20DTSA%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP9W-HK7M]). 
12 See Orly Lobel, The DTSA and the New Secrecy Ecology, 1 BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & 
TAX L. REV. 369, 372-73 (2017). 
13 THE CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET THEFT 9 (2014) (cited in S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2 
(2016)); see also Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Are Our Laws Adequate for Today’s Threats: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2014). 
14 David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. 
L. REV. 291, 293, 301-02 (2009) (finding that trade secret litigation in federal court had doubled every 
decade over the prior thirty years even as federal litigation overall had decreased); David S. Almeling et 
al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 67-68 (2011) (finding 
that trade secret litigation was increasing at a rate faster than that of state litigation overall). 
15 John E. Elmore, A Quantitative Analysis of Damages in Trade Secrets Litigation, INSIGHTS, 
Spring 2016, at 79, 85. 
16 See JOHN E. JANKOWSKI, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NSF 12-307, BUSINESS USE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION DOCUMENTED IN NSF SURVEY 4 (2012), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/
nsf12307/nsf12307.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7AJ-4V2N] (reporting survey results finding that “a diverse 
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therefore cheap to acquire, without any government examination necessary. 
And so long as they remain undisclosed, they can last forever.17 
Part of the story behind trade secrecy’s rise may be a declining value in 
patent protection for certain inventions. Historically, whenever a particular 
invention has been eligible for a patent, firms have strategized whether a 
patent or a trade secret would best allow it to capture the invention’s value. 
Following a series of recent Supreme Court decisions, patent-eligible subject 
matter has narrowed considerably, particularly for software and business 
methods.18 According to some, that narrowing has been nudging firms out of 
the patent system and toward secrecy.19 
Whatever the reason, trade secrets are everywhere—and growing.20 As this 
body of law continues ascending within firms’ IP strategies as well as courts’ 
dockets, its doctrine must figure out what to do in the ubiquitous scenario where 
a defendant’s product isn’t exactly like the plaintiff ’s. As a matter of innovation 
policy, an employee or business partner who comes into contact with a trade 
secret and then ceases to work with its owner must know how to continue 
researching the same problem without incurring liability. The answer cannot be, 
as it de facto too often is, that these individuals must simply find different 
problems to work on. A competing firm could try to deal with the issue by 
setting up a so-called “clean room,” walling itself off from the individual who 
knows the secret. But much of the time, that solution would perversely prevent 
experts from working on the precise line of research they know best. 
 
group of industries reported trade secrets as very or somewhat important to their businesses” more 
so than they did any other form of intellectual property). 
17 The formula for Coca-Cola is probably the most famous example. See Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 294 (D. Del. 1985). But it’s not the oldest. 
See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 651 (2013) 
(discussing the secret formula of metal alloys used in drum cymbals that Avedis Zildjian invented 
in 1623 Constantinople, now property of the Massachusetts-based Avedis Zildjian Company, Inc.). 
18 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
19 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 12, at 376 (“Both the strengthening of trade secret law and the 
uncertainty about patent eligibility of certain biotechnologies, business processes, and software 
inventions may lead today’s firms to rely more heavily on trade secret laws.”); Jeffrey Mordaunt & 
Joshua Swedlow, Why Trade Secret Litigation Is on the Rise, LAW360 (Nov. 14, 2017, 12:16 PM EST), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/983195/why-trade-secret-litigation-is-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/
9H37-66U9] (concluding that given the current rates of patent invalidation, “interested stakeholders 
have justifiable concerns regarding the future value of patents involving software and life sciences”); 
Douglas R. Nemec et al., The Rise of Trade Secret Litigation in the Digital Age, SKADDEN’S 2018 
INSIGHTS (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/01/2018-insights/
the-rise-of-trade-secret-litigation [https://perma.cc/CXU6-UBFS] (arguing that, following the 
Supreme Court’s recent patentable subject matter decisions, “many companies have lost confidence 
in the ability to protect their technology with patents and are instead turning to trade secrets”). 
20 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (dubbing trade secrets “the most pervasive form of intellectual property 
in the modern economy”). 
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There’s a better way. Trade secrecy’s similarity doctrine is currently asking 
an incomplete set of questions. It inquires almost exclusively into the 
defendant’s innovation means, instructing factfinders to determine whether 
the defendant has acquired any useful knowledge from familiarity with the 
secret. It wrongly skips over an inquiry into the defendant’s ends. A more 
sensible test would consider not only the defendant’s benefit from knowing 
the secret, but also the exploitable asset, whether a product or a process, that 
the benefit ultimately translates into. 
This Article proposes that a defendant shouldn’t be liable for using a 
lawfully acquired secret unless it is both exploiting an asset that incorporates 
material elements from the owner’s secret and is doing so in a market that the 
plaintiff actually foresaw or, given industry trends, could reasonably have 
foreseen. Merely relying on a secret as a launching pad for developing a 
genuinely dissimilar good, or operating in a remote and unanticipatable market, 
would remain permissible.21 Under that standard, owners would still remain 
adequately insulated against competition in their core markets. Downstream 
users, meanwhile, would gain some more freedom to pursue cumulative 
innovation. Employees who know secret information but wish to build upon it 
would not be tethered to that same employer. 
There are, however, different ways to commit misappropriation, and our 
proposal affects only one of them: what it means to use a secret. 
Misappropriation can also occur if the defendant discloses the secret or 
improperly acquires it in the first place. For reasons we explain in the Article’s 
final Part, we leave these theories of liability mostly untouched. If defendants 
disclose the underlying secret in ways likely to destroy its value or employ 
improper tactics to obtain it in the first place, the way they happen to be using 
it shouldn’t provide them any shield. Even groundbreaking adapters ought to 
be liable in these cases, just as they would be under current law. 
Part I surveys how trade secrecy handles inexact similarity. Perhaps 
reflecting the lack of any framework internal to trade secret doctrine itself, 
courts sometimes look to a different branch of IP for guidance on assessing 
similarity. When they do, patent law is the usual reference point. But a 
patent’s scope is defined ex ante by written claims, and its nonliteral similarity 
test is keyed to the words in those claims. A trade secret’s scope, by contrast, 
is never truly defined until a misappropriation allegation is actually 
adjudicated in court. As a result, those cases that purport to be analogizing to 
patent doctrine end up assessing holistically what a patent case would dissect 
 
21 We do not deal here with the separate, though related, issue of a defendant’s substantial 
improvement to a plaintiff ’s secret technology. Such improvements could be dealt with if trade 
secrecy had a fair use doctrine, which it currently does not. Perhaps it should. See generally Deepa 
Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401 (2014). 
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into individual elements. If they are channeling patent law, they are doing so 
only at a dizzyingly high level of generality: the unhelpful proposition that 
misappropriation does not require an absolute identity between plaintiff ’s 
and defendant’s products. The analogy does little analytical work toward 
specifying what level of similarity misappropriation actually requires. A few 
trade secret cases gesture instead toward copyright law, but they, too, get no 
further than the starting point that actionable copying need not be verbatim. 
If courts pursuing these cross regime comparisons dug a bit deeper, they 
would discover that trade secrecy currently gives owners much greater control 
over adaptive uses than do patents or copyrights. As we argue in Part II, that 
inflated level of control is neither necessary to protect owners’ investments nor 
healthy for innovation. So we propose three changes to existing misappropriation 
doctrine. First, when factfinders ask whether the defendant is “using” the secret, 
they should focus on the product or process that the defendant is commercially 
exploiting, rather than its earlier R&D steps along the way. A defendant who 
comes up with a radically different product or process after having been lawfully 
exposed to the plaintiff ’s secret shouldn’t be treated the same as one who is 
engaged in outright duplication. Second, a defendant shouldn’t be liable for using 
information unless that information materially contributed to the protectability 
of the trade secret in the first place. Third, only reasonably foreseeable uses of 
the plaintiff ’s secret should be actionable. Unforeseeable ones, which the plaintiff 
did not and could not reasonably have predicted at the time it decided to invest 
in developing the secret, should be permitted. 
Applying this standard would affect some categories of trade secrets more 
than others. Business information like customer lists and pricing data, which 
tend to be used in specific and foreseeable ways, would likely receive the same 
protection it enjoys under current law. Technological information with 
recognizably wide applicability would too. Research tools, for example, would 
be protected against unauthorized use for their intended commercial 
purpose—experimentation—regardless of what fruits a particular experiment 
happened to bear.22 But technological information with seemingly limited 
 
22 In a similar vein, Katherine Strandburg has argued that patent law should distinguish 
between “experimenting on” a typical invention and “experimenting with” a research tool. Katherine 
J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
81, 121-22. Experimenting on an invention “focuse[s] on gaining a better understanding of the 
inventive idea to facilitate further innovation,” while experimenting with a research tool “involves 
using an embodiment of the invention for its intended purpose.” Id. at 121. She advocates a broader 
experimental-use exemption for the former than the latter, since “unauthorized use of a research 
tool has a direct impact on the market for the tool” in a way that tinkering with a garden-variety 
invention does not. Id. at 122. As a result, “uncompensated ‘experimenting with,’ like garden-variety 
patent infringement, directly implicates the incentive to invent by letting some of the free riders 
back into the marketplace.” Id. Whether an invention is indeed a research tool to begin with is, 
however, a factual question that may sometimes be harder to answer, such as in biotechnology and 
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applications, like a particular chemical formula, would receive narrower 
coverage if an unexpected market later arises. This category of information 
would continue to receive protection in the markets that had incentivized the 
owner’s investment—just not the ones that hadn’t. As a general matter, the 
more potential commercial uses a secret has at the outset, the wider the 
protection it receives against another’s use. 
Of course, our proposal would make trade secret protection somewhat less 
attractive to firms. But it may not be such a bad thing to coax some firms into 
disclosing their useful inventions to society through the patent system.23 
To trade secret practitioners, this package of interventions might sound 
radical. As Part II shows, however, copyright law offers some decent proof of 
concept for how our proposed similarity framework could be structured. 
Copyright infringement analysis breaks the concept of copying down into 
two halves, one factual and one normative. Even if a defendant did copy 
something from the plaintiff as a matter of historical fact, the plaintiff must 
also show that the copied portion was substantial enough to justify liability as 
a matter of normative judgment. 
As part of that second, normative inquiry, courts routinely disregard a 
defendant’s preliminary and otherwise-infringing draft if the final product released 
to market turns out to be noninfringing. In doing so, they effectively permit a 
reproduction so long as it never attains independent economic significance and thus 
poses no threat to the owner’s legitimate markets—even if, as is often the case, that 
reproduction helps a second comer learn more about the field. 
And copyright’s infringement framework encompasses not just similarity 
between the works themselves but also between their commercial uses. 
Through its fair use doctrine, copyright law frequently discounts a defendant’s 
exploitation if it was in a genuinely unforeseeable market. While the cases 
don’t make this doctrinal move as consistently as they do the other two, 
defendants on average have a stronger argument against liability if they are 
operating in a market that was not reasonably predictable within the plaintiff ’s 
industry. When properly invoked, this limitation allows second comers to 
exploit remote opportunities that the owner would not have envisioned. 
Finally, Part III sketches out some possible ways to implement our 
suggestions. We think that the best place to reform substantial derivation doctrine 
is within the underlying definition of liability. Under our primary proposal, a 
plaintiff must prove a material and foreseeable use as part of its case in chief. There 
 
software contexts where “the ‘tools’ of the trade are often of the same technological nature as the 
subject of the research.” Id. at 148. 
23 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(observing that “trade secret protection provides in some instances a substantial disincentive to 
entrance into the patent system,” which “deprives society of the benefits of public disclosure of the 
invention which it is the policy of the patent laws to encourage”). 
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are, however, other ways to increase judicial tolerance for these uses without 
tinkering with the elements of the plaintiff ’s case. Courts could instead conduct 
these inquiries as part of an affirmative defense or while calculating remedies after 
liability has been established. We present the pros and cons of each alternative. 
Whichever approach one favors, however, we emphasize that the ball is in courts’ 
hands. For any of them, no statutory change would be necessary. 
I. SIMILARITY IN TRADE SECRECY 
When it comes to similarity standards, there are scholarly cottage 
industries devoted to copyright’s pathologies on the one hand and patent law’s 
on the other. So as we add trade secrecy to the mix, it may seem strange to 
study those two very regimes in search of insights. Still, there are a few good 
reasons to juxtapose the three together. 
First and fundamentally, they are each on some level trying to accomplish 
the same thing: encouraging investment in developing informational goods that 
would be undersupplied without some exclusivity mechanism to ward off 
imitators who wouldn’t bear the originator’s fixed costs.24 To be sure, 
policymakers should also look beyond IP’s borders; the common law of property, 
tort, and contract can provide guidance, too.25 But given the idiosyncratic 
difficulties of delineating rights in intangible information that is abstract and in 
some way new, other IP regimes can be especially fruitful areas to consult.26 
Here, we should pause to lay our first-principle cards on the table: we 
start from the utilitarian premise that trade secret protection’s primary 
justification is to encourage the production and (limited) sharing of socially 
valuable information. The Supreme Court has endorsed that justification,27 
 
24 See Varadarajan, supra note 21, at 1408 (“[Trade secrecy] is increasingly theorized as a subset 
of intellectual property because it shares the incentive-promoting goals of patent and copyright. 
Courts and scholars often justify patent, copyright, and trade secret laws as mechanisms to encourage 
the invention or creation of new technological advances and expressive works.”); cf. Jeanne C. 
Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1442-43 (2010) (“Using the 
same theoretical approach to explain or challenge [copyright’s and patent’s] dissimilarities indicates 
that, at their foundation, patent and copyright law have more in common than legal scholarship 
often appreciates . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
25 Indeed, we draw an analogy to tort law foreseeability principles below. See infra subsection 
II.C.1. For more extended discussions of how common law doctrines should influence IP law, see, 
for example, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 269 
(2016), Dmitry Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV. 565 (2017), 
Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 
1742 (2007), and Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657 (2014). 
26 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 726 (2009). 
27 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484-85 (“Trade secret law will encourage invention in areas where 
patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery 
and exploitation of his invention.”); id. at 486 (observing that, absent trade secret protection, “[t]he 
holder of a trade secret would . . . hoard rather than disseminate knowledge” and “[i]nstead, then, 
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and many commentators today build on that bedrock.28 By giving the 
information’s developer the right to control others’ usage, trade secrecy can 
stimulate investment that might not have been made without the possibility 
of supracompetitive profits. And by lowering the likelihood of ruinous public 
disclosure, it can reduce reliance on wasteful self-help to preserve secrecy and 
encourage the efficient sharing of information within the firm or between 
business partners. This rationale is not the only one available, however. Many 
courts have invoked a different theory in which the duty not to 
misappropriate helps maintain an industry’s standards of commercial ethics.29 
Other commentators have criticized that theory, and we don’t intend to 
litigate its merits here.30 If you’re a proponent of it, though, you should know 
now that this Article doesn’t address it further. 
Second, as this Part surveys, some judges are already invoking patent and, 
to a lesser degree, copyright law in working through trade secrecy’s similarity 
standard.31 Lining up trade secrecy’s treatment of copyright and patent 
doctrines next to those same doctrines in their native habitats reveals the 
strengths and weaknesses of these judicial analogies. Finally, however 
imperfect these other regimes may be, judges have been refining their 
contours since the start of the Republic—considerably longer than trade 
secrecy has existed as a formal body of law. Warts and all, copyright and 
patent may have valuable lessons to offer to the relative newcomer. 
 
of licensing others to use his invention and making the most efficient use of existing manufacturing 
and marketing structures within the industry, the trade secret holder would . . . limit his utilization 
of the invention, thereby depriving the public of the maximum benefit of its use”); see also, e.g., Am. 
Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The primary purpose of trade secret law 
is to encourage innovation and development . . . .”); ROGER M. MILGRIM, 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE 
SECRETS § 2.01 (2019) (listing cases describing trade secrets as property and intellectual property). 
28 See, e.g., David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES, Winter 1991, at 61, 64 (contending that trade secrecy “supplements the patent 
system” and is “congruent with the basic economic explanation for patent protection—that it provides 
a means of internalizing the benefits of innovation”); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating 
Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 329 (2008) (arguing that trade secrets should be 
understood as IP rights because they share “two critical features . . . with other IP rights—they 
promote inventive activity and they promote disclosure of those inventions”). But cf. Robert G. Bone, 
The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1807-08 (2014) (expressing 
skepticism that “trade secret law generates incentive benefits that exceed its costs”). 
29 See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970); 
Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 1354-55 (Mass. 1979); RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (defining wrongful acquisition as through means “which 
fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct”). Even 
the Supreme Court in Kewanee, in the midst of its exposition on trade secrecy’s role in promoting 
innovation, noted that “[t]he maintenance of standards of commercial ethics” is an additional 
“polic[y] behind trade secret law.” 416 U.S. at 481. 
30 For a skeptical take, see Bone, supra note 28, at 1810, and Lemley, supra note 28, at 327-28. 
31 See infra Sections II.B–C. 
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This Part begins in Section I.A with a brief overview of a few basic points 
of trade secret law. Section I.B turns to the doctrine of substantial derivation, 
trade secrecy’s mechanism for analyzing inexact adaptations of protected 
information. Section I.C highlights the substantial derivation cases that 
purport to be analogizing to corresponding doctrines in patent law, yet don’t 
seem to be doing a very good job. Finally, Section I.D does the same for cases 
that analogize to copyright. 
A. Background 
Trade secret law protects valuable information that companies try to keep 
secret, including both technological inventions like chemical formulas and 
business information like pricing data.32 While state trade secret laws vary at 
the margins, almost every state has enacted a version of the UTSA.33 In 2016, 
Congress passed the DTSA, introducing a new federal civil claim for trade 
secret misappropriation that largely mirrors the UTSA.34 
Trade secrecy has a different origin story than patent and copyright law. 
Rather than beginning with the First Congress exercising its powers under the 
Constitution’s IP Clause,35 trade secret protection grew out of nineteenth-century 
common law and unfair competition principles.36 Despite the different 
provenance, however, most contemporary commentators have come to view 
trade secrets as a subset of IP, a tool to promote innovation and information 
sharing similar to patents and copyrights.37 To acquire protection, a company 
possessing an eligible secret need not apply to any government agency or define 
 
32 See 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE: 2018, at 36 (2018 ed.). 
33 The UTSA, a model state statute, was issued by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1979. As of this writing, all states have adopted the UTSA except for New York 
and North Carolina. See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
committees/community-home?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 [https://perma.cc/
NK33-XH4E]. More recently, the 1995 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition describes the principles 
of trade secret law, which are largely consistent with the UTSA. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). Courts have not, however, accepted it widely. 
See James Pooley, The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act Improves the Protection 
of Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2016). 
34 For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the DTSA and UTSA, see Lobel, 
supra note 12, at 372-73, and Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal 
Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 840-41, 843-45 (2017). 
35 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
36 See, e.g., James Pooley, supra note 33, at 1048. For a detailed history of the evolution of trade secret 
law in the United States, see generally Sharon Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts 
Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010). 
37 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
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ex ante the boundaries of their entitlements. The legal right simply springs into 
being by operation of law. As a result, tricky issues of validity and scope are left 
to be worked out through litigation. 
To qualify for protection, information must meet several criteria.38 First, it 
must have “independent economic value, actual or potential.”39 Second, it cannot 
be “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” by others in the field, meaning that 
firms may not claim any exclusivity over published or well-known industry data.40 
Third, even if those criteria are satisfied, the owner must continuously engage in 
reasonable measures to keep the information secret.41 While a trade secret has no 
fixed term, protection expires as a practical matter once the secret gets out.42 
To succeed on a trade secret claim, a plaintiff must show not only that a 
valid trade secret exists but also that the defendant misappropriated it.43 
Misappropriation can occur in a few ways. The first is wrongful acquisition. 
One may not learn a secret using “improper means,” a nebulous category that 
includes not only acts that are independently unlawful (think wiretapping or 
trespassing), but also those that fall below “generally accepted standards of 
commercial morality and reasonable conduct.”44 These improper means cases 
typically involve individuals with no prior relationship to the plaintiff, 
potentially competitors, engaged in some form of competitive intelligence.45 
A second and more common flavor of misappropriation is using or 
disclosing the secret in violation of a confidentiality duty. The vast majority 
of trade secret cases under state law involve departing employees accused of 
breaching express confidentiality duties in nondisclosure agreements.46 Other 
business associates, such as joint-venture collaborators, suppliers, and 
distributors, may also be subject to express or implied confidentiality duties.47 
Early returns show this trend continuing under the DTSA, with two-thirds 
of all cases filed in the law’s first year involving a current or former employee, 
 
38 These criteria are laid out similarly in 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012), and UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
39 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). 
40 Id. 
41 Reasonable secrecy efforts can take different forms in different contexts, including both physical 
and contractual means. For a discussion of this requirement and the reasons behind it, see generally 
Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Precautions, Possession, and Notice, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (2017). 
42 See, e.g., MENELL ET AL., supra note 32, at 58; MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 1.05. 
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2). 
44 E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1939)). Christopher, likely the most famous 
improper means case, involved aerial spying. 
45 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 318. 
46 See, e.g., Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, supra 
note 14, at 68-69 (finding that in seventy-seven percent of state appellate decisions between 1995 
and 2009, the alleged misappropriator was an employee or former employee). 
47 See, e.g., id. 
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a quarter involving a current or former business partner, and only a tenth 
involving parties without any prior relationship.48 Finally, third parties can 
commit misappropriation by using or disclosing the secret if they “knew or 
had reason to know” that the information had previously been obtained 
through improper means or in violation of a confidentiality duty.49 
Each of these acts is an independent basis for liability. A defendant who 
acquires a secret improperly has committed misappropriation, even without 
any later disclosure or use. Likewise, a defendant who uses or discloses the 
secret in violation of a confidentiality duty has committed misappropriation, 
even if the initial acquisition of that secret was entirely proper (as is often the 
case with former employees or business associates).50 Despite this conceptual 
distinction among acquisition, disclosure, and use, plaintiffs may allege 
multiple theories, and courts sometimes conflate them.51 
Out of these various forms of misappropriation, disputes over adaptations of 
trade secrets will most likely implicate the meaning of unauthorized use.52 A 
defendant who improperly acquired the secret in the first instance would, after 
all, already be liable; downstream adaptation would be beside the point. In the 
typical scenario, an individual defendant was once associated with the trade secret 
owner before leaving to join a competitor or start a competing business himself. 
That business then exploits a product or process that is different from—but 
arguably similar enough to—the trade secret. The owner sues the individual (and 
sometimes the new employer) for using the secret without permission. The 
following Sections walk through how courts have come to analyze these cases. 
B. Substantial Derivation 
As in other areas of IP, actionable use in trade secrecy encompasses more than 
exact duplication. Trade secret protection would be “quite hollow,” in one court’s 
words, if it were not “flexible enough to reach . . . modifications.”53 The 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition instructs that “an actor is liable for using 
the trade secret [even] with independently created improvements or modifications 
 
48 David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the First 
Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 146 (2018). 
49 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
50 See, e.g., GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O’Neill, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1235 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
51 See infra Part III. 
52 We say most likely, rather than exclusively, because the firm that hires the former employee 
or associate might itself face a claim for third-party acquisition. That possibility is discussed further 
in Section III.A below. 
53 American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (explaining that the defendant’s 
“unauthorized use need not extend to every aspect or feature of the trade secret” to give rise to liability). 
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if the result is substantially derived from the trade secret.”54 Under this substantial 
derivation standard, there is no actionable use “if the contribution made by the 
trade secret is so slight that the actor’s product or process can be said to derive 
from other sources of information or from independent creation.”55 
Several trade secret cases recite this Restatement formulation in assessing 
when similarity becomes actionable.56 In theory, at least, “substantial derivation” 
comprises two questions. First, as a threshold factual matter, did the defendant 
rely on or benefit from information obtained from the plaintiff (as opposed to 
entirely independent R&D)? If so, a second question follows: was that reliance 
significant enough, as a normative matter, to warrant liability? As the Restatement 
emphasizes, some contributions will be “so slight” that the defendant can’t be held 
to have truly “used” the secret in a way the law should penalize. 
Despite the Restatement’s nod toward a materiality threshold, many cases 
minimize or flout it. They instead emphasize the defendant’s reliance on any aspect 
of the plaintiff’s secret. Whether that aspect was significant doesn’t come up. 
This inattention to materiality comes in different forms. In some cases, 
the court is so preoccupied with a defendant’s admission of use that it doesn’t 
seem to care that the information used was publicly available—and thus 
unprotectable in the first place. In Smith v. Dravo Corp., for example, the 
defendant sold shipping containers, allegedly based on information that it 
received during confidential negotiations to acquire the plaintiff ’s business.57 
Because much of the information was readily ascertainable from the containers 
that the plaintiff itself openly sold, the district court found no improper use 
of trade secret information.58 But the Seventh Circuit disagreed, reasoning 
that even if the defendant could have obtained information from public 
sources, it in fact had not.59 The court deemed the defendant’s use improper 
because its containers were “striking[ly] similar[]” to the plaintiff ’s.60 Left 
unaddressed was the fact that many of those similarities were attributable to 
the containers’ publicly observable features. The court neither isolated this 
 
54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) 
(emphasis added). 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG U.S., Inc., 836 F.3d 447, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2016); 
Spear Mktg., Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586, 601 (5th Cir. 2015); Penalty Kick Mgmt., 
Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003); EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., 49 F. 
Supp. 3d 1210, 1225 (N.D. Ga. 2014); Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Grp. Ams., Inc., 325 
F. Supp. 2d 457, 460-61 (D. Del. 2004). 
57 203 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1953). 
58 Id. at 374. 
59 See id. at 374-75 (citing with approval Pennsylvania’s approach that asks “[h]ow did defendant 
learn of plaintiff ’s design” rather than whether “the design could have been obtained through inspection”). 
60 Id. at 377. 
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unprotectable information nor asked whether the defendant had incorporated 
a significant amount of protectable information. 
Similarly, in Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chemical Co., the Third Circuit held a 
defendant liable for using a secret process for manufacturing latex paint vehicles, 
even though prior publications had revealed much of the relevant information 
already.61 That the defendant happened to learn the information from the 
plaintiff, not from those publications, was enough. Likewise, in Affiliated Hospital 
Products, Inc. v. Baldwin, aspects of the plaintiff ’s process for manufacturing 
hypodermic needles were “already in the public domain” or could have been 
gleaned from “the end product, the machine itself.”62 That public availability 
didn’t matter. Instead, the fact that the defendants “admitted that [they] looked 
at” the plaintiff ’s design plans dominated the court’s misappropriation analysis.63 
In other cases, the plaintiff ’s secret may at least be protectable, but the court 
ignores or minimizes significant dissimilarities between it and the defendant’s 
product. Instead, it focuses on defendant’s access to the plaintiff ’s secret, 
seemingly indifferent to whether the copied elements were significant or trivial. 
A pair of software cases from the Fifth Circuit illustrates this approach’s sway. 
In Spear Marketing, Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank, the court reasoned that 
because the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s competing bank inventory 
management programs were insufficiently similar, the defendant couldn’t 
have used the plaintiff ’s trade secrets.64 Direct evidence had established that 
the defendant had been exposed to the secret.65 But the court required 
something more.66 It noted that the plaintiff could “point[] to no similarity” 
between the programs’ interfaces and had failed to introduce any expert 
testimony “perform[ing] a side-by-side comparison of the two programs.”67 
Instead the plaintiff had merely touted the similarity of the two programs’ 
“general function.”68 Rejecting such a “toothless” view of similarity, the court 
concluded that “[s]uch an overly generous application of the [use] test would 
 
61 689 F.2d 424, 431 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 
1953) (“It matters not that defendants could have gained their knowledge from a study of the expired 
patent and plaintiffs’ publicly marketed product. The fact is that they did not. Instead they gained 
it from plaintiffs via their confidential relationship . . . .”). 
62 373 N.E.2d 1000, 1005-06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
63 Id. at 1006; see also Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 652 (5th Cir. 1997) (failing to 
isolate information contained in a secret fiberglass boat mold that could be readily ascertained from 
“pre-existing hulls [that] were in the public domain”). 
64 See 791 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2015) (observing that, among other differences, the 
defendant’s program incorporated “different predictive algorithms” and involved a closer 
“integr[ation] with the rest of the bank’s operating system” than the plaintiff ’s). 
65 Id. at 600. 
66 Id. at 601 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 1995)). 
67 Id. at 601-02. 
68 Id. at 602. 
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allow an inference of use in virtually every trade secret misappropriation 
claim in which there is evidence” that the defendant had access to plaintiff ’s 
proprietary information.69 Despite trade secret law’s generally “broad” 
definition of use,70 the court still signaled that succeeding on a substantial 
derivation theory demands some showing of materiality, at least in cases 
where “the trade secret at issue is a technical feature of a computer program.”71 
That proposition lasted barely more than a year before the same court 
changed course. In GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG United States, Inc., the 
defendant had allegedly used trade secrets to develop a competing inventory 
management software.72 The Fifth Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict of 
misappropriation.73 On the issue of improper use, the court was unmoved by a 
“lack of similarity evidence” between the competitors’ software.74 It was enough 
that they “perform[ed] similar functions.”75 In the court’s view, a properly “broad” 
definition of trade secret use required only access to confidential information76 
plus “any exploitation”77 or use “on any level,” “in any way,” or “any part,” 
including any “reliance on . . . facilitating research and development.”78 To the 
extent that the panel in Spear had suggested otherwise, it had been wrong.79 
Such sweeping language is common.80 In some judicial formulations, the 
use element essentially becomes a but-for test: if the defendant wouldn’t have 
thought to pursue a particular research project without having first been 
exposed to the secret, it has committed misappropriation—regardless of how 
far afield that research leads.81 In such cases, it doesn’t matter if the 
defendant’s product is significantly different. Nor does it matter if the 
 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 600. 
71 Id. at 600-01. 
72 836 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2016). Curiously, the plaintiff did not have to provide any “specific description 
of the trade secrets.” Id. at 493 (citing Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, L.L.P., 716 F.3d 867, 875 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
73 Id. at 481. 
74 Id. at 497. 
75 Id. at 499. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 497. 
78 Id. at 498. 
79 Id. at 497. 
80 See, e.g., Think Village–Kiwi, LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 08-4166, 2009 WL 3837270, at 
*3-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009); Superior Flux & Mfg. Co. v. H&S Indus., Inc., No. 79-2327, 1980 
WL 30229, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 1980); Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Baldwin, 373 N.E.2d 
1000, 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
81 See, e.g., Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 285 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (defining the actionable use standard as whether the defendant “could not have created its 
product without the use of [the plaintiff ’s] trade secrets”); Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat’l 
Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a jury instruction to “find that defendants 
misappropriated Mangren’s trade secrets even if defendants created a new product if defendants 
could not have done so without use of Mangren’s trade secret”). 
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defendant is even competing with the plaintiff. Indeed, at least one court has 
flatly rejected the proposition that it would.82 
Even when courts pay attention to similarity, they sometimes focus 
exclusively on quantity rather than its qualitative significance—a bean-counting 
approach that offers little insight into what work the similarity concept is 
supposed to be doing. Take, for example, the Court of Appeals of Texas’s 
decision in Bishop v. Miller, a case about a secret process for mining potash.83 
The defendant, a once-potential investor who had observed the owner’s 
methods but then backed away, argued that the process he employed was so 
dissimilar to the owner’s that no actionable use had occurred.84 The owner’s 
expert witness opined that the protected method consisted of 21 components, 
of which the defendant had copied 15.85 That testimony, said the court, was 
enough to sustain a jury’s verdict of misappropriation despite a competing 
expert who considered the methods “fundamentally different.”86 
Perhaps this was the right result. Perhaps not. Either way, the court never 
appeared interested in the qualitative significance of those numbers. Is 15 out 
of 21 an important statistic because the overlap was enough to make the 
mining processes technologically equivalent? Because it somehow increased 
the commercial threat to the owner? Or just because 71% seems like a large 
number? On the face of the opinion, no one can say. 
A similarly thin analysis appeared in Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc.87 The case 
concerned a defendant who had modified a protected 90-foot boat-hull design 
to create the bow portion of a new 110-foot mold. Though the defendant alleged 
that it had altered the shape and form of the mold, the court denied summary 
judgment based in part on an expert’s testimony that somewhere between 40 
and 45 feet of the design was essentially the same.88 Of course, one could just 
as easily say that between 45 and 50 feet of the original mold was entirely 
different. Future litigants are left to guess why these numbers matter. 
While such shallow focus on quantitative similarity will often hand 
plaintiffs dubious victories, it could also deprive them of deserved ones. The 
decision in Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Forscan Corp. shows how.89 After the 
plaintiff accused its employee of handing a competitor trade secrets over an 
electronic device, the appeals court refused to enjoin the sale of the defendant’s 
 
82 See Collelo v. Geographic Servs., Inc., 727 S.E.2d 55, 61-62 (Va. 2012) (reversing a favorable ruling 
for a defendant that did not compete with the plaintiff and holding that a misappropriation claim does not 
require “us[ing] the allegedly misappropriated trade secret to compete with the holder of the trade secret”). 
83 412 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. App. 2013). 
84 Id. at 765, 773. 
85 Id. at 774. 
86 Id. at 774-75. 
87 126 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1997). 
88 Id. at 651. 
89 641 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App. 1982). 
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devices in part because the plaintiff “only characterized 25 of 1000 components 
of the tool as being similar.”90 Here, again, the mistake isn’t that the reported 
opinion necessarily gets the answer wrong—wrong or right in this case isn’t 
terribly obvious. The mistake is that the court doesn’t seem interested in 
asking the right question. The court’s discussion lacks a qualitative dimension. 
Perhaps those 25 components were the key to the proprietary technology, 
while the other 975 were well known in the field or unimportant surplusage. 
If so, the “1000” denominator of the court’s fraction would grossly understate 
the plaintiff ’s contribution to the defendant’s product.91 
In sum, while in theory the Restatement’s substantial derivation framework 
may let courts address a use’s materiality, in practice many simply don’t bother. 
One possible source of guidance is other IP regimes with more established 
jurisprudences on actionable similarity. As the following two Sections discuss, 
some cases have looked beyond trade secret precedent. Some have drawn 
analogies to patent law. A few others have invoked copyright law. In none of 
them, however, does the analogy seem to advance the analysis much. 
C. Analogies to Patent Law 
The notion that trade secret law might borrow from patent law has an 
immediate appeal. Patent law covers functional inventions, from machinery to 
pharmaceuticals,92 and much of what could be patented could be maintained 
as a trade secret instead. Unsurprisingly, then, many trade secret cases have 
referenced patent doctrine in sorting through a defendant’s derivation.93 
 
90 Id. at 317. 
91 See also Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 278 N.E.2d 636, 641 (N.Y. 1972) (concluding that the 
defendant’s contacting of “47 of the 1,100 of [plaintiffs’] customers” based on “casual memory” did 
not constitute misappropriation of the plaintiff ’s customer list, without assessing the importance of 
the particular customers at issue). 
92 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent . . . .”). 
93 See, e.g., Reingold, 126 F.3d at 651 (5th Cir. 1997); Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 
330 (7th Cir. 1984); Motorola, Inc. v. Comput. Displays Int’l, Inc., 739 F.2d 1149, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 
1984); Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 684 (7th Cir. 1983); Cataphote Corp. v. 
Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970); Bolt Assocs. v. Alpine Geophysical Assocs., 365 F.2d 
742, 748 (3d Cir. 1966); Sinclair v. Aquarius, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (Ct. App. 1974); Materials Dev. 
Corp. v. Atlantic Advanced Metals, Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 615 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1971); Minn. 
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Tech. Tape Corp., 221 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60-61 (App. Div. 1961). But see Cook Grp. 
Inc. v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 199 F.3d 1329 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (asserting 
without authority that “[t]he doctrine of equivalents is primarily a patent law doctrine and its 
application in the trade secret context has been quite limited” and therefore refusing to consider it in 
assessing the alleged substantial derivation of a trade secret); BladeRoom Grp. Ltd. v. Facebook, Inc., 
No. 15-1370, 2018 WL 514923, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) (“[T]he method of defending against 
patent infringement by comparing claim limitations to elements, and showing that one does not read 
on the other, is unsuited to showing the absence of a triable fact of trade secret misappropriation.”). 
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Indeed, the connection between the two has a lengthy pedigree, going back 
at least to 1927.94 
Nevertheless, any analogy between these two regimes inevitably reaches 
a stumbling block. While trade secret scope is never defined on paper until 
it’s adjudicated, patent scope revolves around the written word. Patent cases 
compare the defendant’s product not with any tangible thing but with the 
patent document’s “claims,” highly stylized declarations of scope that courts 
often dub the “metes and bounds” of the invention.95 A patent plaintiff must 
typically prove that each literal element within the relevant claim can be 
found within the defendant’s product.96 
As a result, when trade secret cases bring up patent law, they nearly always 
have in mind a judge-made exception called the doctrine of equivalents.97 
Under that doctrine, a product that skirts the literal words of a particular claim 
element may still infringe if it comes close enough.98 To determine whether 
the defendant’s device crosses that line, many courts ask whether an expert in 
the field would consider it “insubstantially different” or find that it “performs 
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain 
substantially the same result” as the claim limitation.99 The Supreme Court 
has endorsed this common law expansion of patent scope on the grounds that 
 
94 Tower Mfg. Co. v. Monsanto Chem. Works, 20 F.2d 386, 387 (S.D.N.Y 1927). 
95 E.g., In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Patent 
Act requires patentees to include “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly 
claiming the subject matter which the [applicant] regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Early 
American patent law did not require them, however, leaving validity and infringement to be 
determined based on the written description of the invention. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. 
Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim 
Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2014); Fromer, supra note 26, at 721. 
96 See, e.g., Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (“To establish literal infringement, every limitation set forth in a claim must be found in an accused 
product, exactly.” (quoting Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
97 One recent exception is Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., Ltd., 693 F.3d 102 (1st 
Cir. 2012). That case drew instead from § 102(f) of the prior Patent Act, a provision concerning 
validity rather than infringement, to interpret the meaning of the term “derived” in a nondisclosure 
agreement. Id. at 110. 
98 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997). 
99 E.g., David Netzer Consulting Eng’r LLC v. Shell Oil Co., 824 F.3d 989, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
The trial court may choose which test to apply based on the facts involved. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 
520 U.S. at 39-40 (concluding that the precise formulation of this test is “less important that whether 
the test is probative of the essential inquiry: [d]oes the accused product or process contain elements 
identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention”). Some supplement these 
tests by looking into the “known interchangeability” of claimed elements with features of the accused 
product. See, e.g., Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
abrogated by Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014). 
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claim drafting is necessarily inexact and that copyists shouldn’t be allowed to 
change minor details of an invention to avoid a patent’s literal scope.100 
Yet aside from the innocuous but unhelpful recognition that trade secret 
misappropriation can encompass a defendant’s trivial modifications, courts’ 
analogies to patent law are superficial. To start, modern patent law’s 
equivalents analysis remains tied to the written claim. In an earlier era, patent 
cases would find equivalence by comparing the overall similarity between the 
plaintiff ’s and defendant’s products.101 But today a patentee must show 
equivalence between each element in the claim language and some 
corresponding structure in the accused device.102 “Generalized testimony as to 
the overall similarity between the claims and the accused infringer’s product 
or process will not suffice.”103 One missing element from the claim dooms a 
plaintiff ’s case, no matter how similar the rest of the defendant’s product. 
Trade secrets, by contrast, have no formal claims that predate litigation.104 
Nor do trade secrets come presorted into elements.105 Courts must instead 
 
100 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) 
(“If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, . . . [u]nimportant and insubstantial 
substitutes . . . could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts 
of copying.”); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (explaining 
that limiting patent scope to claims’ literal terms “would leave room for—indeed encourage—the 
unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions”). 
101 See, e.g., Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611-12 (comparing the parties’ compositions and finding 
the two “substantially identical in operation and in result”). In the era before patent claims were 
required, courts’ analysis of patent infringement analysis bore “a remarkable resemblance” to Graver 
Tank’s product-focused equivalence analysis. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD 
DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 711 (7th ed. 2017). In the era of patent 
claiming, however, the doctrine of equivalents is seen as “an exception to the general rule that 
infringement is determined by claim language.” Id.; see also Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, 
Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 1947, 1963 (2005) (“As the prominence of claims increased, the equitable standards for non-literal 
patent infringement coalesced into the doctrine of equivalents.”). 
102 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 21, 29; cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum 
Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 31 (2005) (critiquing the way that courts identify 
an invention’s “elements”). 
103 Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
104 During litigation, some jurisdictions require plaintiffs to describe the allegedly 
misappropriated trade secrets with “sufficient particularity.” See, e.g., Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., 
Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998). California goes further than most by statutorily requiring 
plaintiffs to identify trade secrets with “reasonable particularity” before the discovery phase of 
litigation. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (West 2018). 
105 In some sense, to be sure, patent claims don’t come presorted, either. One can’t break a 
claim into constituent elements without knowing where one element ends and the next begins, and 
the answer is often contestable. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 102, at 31 (noting the lack of an 
established standard “as to either the size of the textual element or the level of abstraction at which 
the element will be evaluated” and that “[c]ourts define an element almost arbitrarily”); Matthew 
C. Phillips, Taking a Step Beyond Maxwell to Tame the Doctrine of Equivalents, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 155, 162 (2000) (“The definition of an ‘element’ is slippery and probably 
cannot be settled without some resort to arbitrariness.”). Still, claims at least arrive with a fixed text 
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figure out trade secret scope on the spot.106 Since the doctrine of equivalents 
has evolved into a tool to help map words onto physical things, it offers little 
substantive guidance for trade secret cases. Unsurprisingly then, trade secret 
cases that invoke the doctrine of equivalents do not appear to draw any 
substantive lesson from it. It’s little more than jurisprudential name dropping. 
Reingold, the case about modified boat hulls discussed above, is a 
characteristic example.107 The court there denied a motion to dismiss the claim 
on summary judgment, concluding that something more than “[o]utright and 
forth right [sic] duplication” could still trigger liability just as it might under 
patent law’s “analogous problem of patent equivalents.”108 But although in the 
patent context one would have expected to see some discussion of the alleged 
equivalents’ substantiality, the Reingold court offered none. 
Indeed, in the one misappropriation decision we’ve found where a 
defendant actually pressed for a more rigorous application of the doctrine of 
equivalents, the court refused. In that case, the plaintiff accused Facebook of 
unlawfully using its data-center technology, while Facebook argued that its 
product was simply too different to subject it to liability.109 In moving for 
summary judgment, Facebook asked the court to break down the trade secret 
into “components and then compare[] these components to [those of] the 
accused product,” just as it would in the equivalents analysis “normally 
reserved for patent infringement cases.”110 The court denied the motion. It 
held that “[t]he broad definition of ‘use’ applicable to trade secret claims” 
made an element-by-element comparison “unsuited to showing the absence 
of a triable fact of trade secret misappropriation.”111 
 
over which to argue. To disaggregate physical objects into elements, by contrast, would require a 
new text to be constructed from scratch, even if only in the mind of the disaggregator. As 
interpretively complex as the identification of textual elements is, that complexity is only multiplied 
when there is no agreed-upon language in which to find them. 
106 A court’s task is complicated by the fact that, in the absence of a formal claiming regime, 
plaintiffs are more likely to make “strategic” assertions regarding the scope of their intellectual 
property rights during litigation, in order “to fit the contours of particular disputes.” See Jeanne C. 
Fromer & Mark. P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 123, 169 (2018). 
107 See supra text accompanying notes 87–88. 
108 Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F. 3d 645, 651 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg., Co. v. Linde 
Air Prods, Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)). 
109 BladeRoom Grp. Ltd. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 15-1370, 2018 WL 514923, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 23, 2018). 
110 Id. at *8. 
111 Id. at *9. The parties would ultimately settle in the middle of trial. See Bonnie Eslinger, 
Facebook Settles $365M Trade Secrets Case Mid-Trial, LAW360 (Apr. 9, 2018, 1:08 PM EDT), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1031167/facebook-settles-365m-trade-secrets-case-mid-trial. 
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D. Analogies to Copyright Law 
While judges seeking doctrinal parallels in other IP regimes most commonly 
look to patent law, a handful of cases have drawn instead from copyright.112 
Copyright law covers works of authorship such as books, music, films, and 
software113—though it’s virtually always the last of these that is at issue in cases 
on trade secret derivation.114 If the judges in these cases are aware of their peers’ 
reliance on patent law, they don’t say so. But just as in the patent-analogy cases, 
the move to copyright doctrine ends up doing little work in the analysis. 
Copyright protection extends only to a work’s particular expression of ideas, 
not to the ideas themselves.115 Still, far more than the complete, literal text falls 
on the “expression” side of the divide. Abstract patterns and fragments of a 
work can qualify, from a plotline in a narrative work to melody lines in a musical 
one. As a result, copyright ends up policing against not only verbatim but also 
nonverbatim copying, “else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations,” 
in Judge Learned Hand’s famous phrasing.116 At the same time, the law also 
recognizes that “[n]ot all copying . . . is copyright infringement.”117 Just as in 
trade secret and patent law, the trick is figuring out which is which. 
To accomplish that task, copyright doesn’t look to any prewritten claims 
as patent law does. Instead, it assesses the works’ likeness directly through 
two theoretically distinct but practically overlapping doctrines: substantial 
similarity and the derivative-work right. First, to succeed on any claim of 
infringement under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff must show that its work is 
substantially similar to the defendant’s.118 Merely copying something from a 
work isn’t enough. The copied expression must also be quantitatively or 
 
112 See, e.g., Comprehensive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 737 (4th 
Cir. 1993), vacated pursuant to settlement; Engenium Sols., Inc. v. Symphonic Techs., Inc., 924 F. 
Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Integral Sys., Inc. v. Peoplesoft, Inc., No. 90-2598, 1991 WL 498874, 
at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1991). 
113 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
114 The one nonsoftware case that we have found in this category should never have included 
a trade secrecy claim to begin with. In Stromback v. New Line Cinema, the purported secrets at issue 
were a screenplay and a poem. 384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2004). Because these expressive goods require 
public dissemination to achieve economic value, the court rightly found them to be ineligible subject 
matter for trade secret protection. Id. at 305. But as an alternative basis for dismissal, the court also 
concluded that the only similarities between the defendant’s and plaintiff ’s works were stock themes, 
which by definition are not secrets. Id. at 306. 
115 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
116 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
117 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
118 See, e.g., Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (“[T]he question is whether the part so taken is ‘substantial’ 
. . . .”); ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW § 1:1 (2017); 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:59 (2010) (“For copying to 
constitute infringement, a defendant must have reproduced a material amount of the plaintiffs [sic] 
expression, or as is frequently stated, the parties’ works must be ‘substantially similar.’”). 
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qualitatively significant.119 This judge-made gloss on statutory copyright 
protection functions as a materiality threshold for all infringement actions.120 
Second, the Copyright Act also grants owners the exclusive right to 
“prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”121 Many courts 
identify a work as a derivative by asking whether it would qualify as 
substantially similar under the reproduction right, conditioning infringement 
of one right on infringement of another.122 The derivative work right thus 
often ends up covering the same ground that the substantial similarity doctrine 
already covers.123 Indeed, the derivative work right’s primary real-world effect 
may simply be to enlarge the reproduction right with which it so often 
travels.124 For that reason, we discuss them as a pair. 
To assess unlawful similarity, courts have developed different approaches 
depending on how technically complex the work’s subject matter is. In most 
cases involving artistic works like novels or paintings, they instruct juries to 
adopt a layperson’s perspective.125 The question of fact posed to this 
hypothetical layperson is, in one leading formulation’s words, whether “the 
ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect disparities, would be disposed 
to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”126 
 
119 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 543, 548-49 (1985). 
120 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 
206 (2012) (explaining that substantial similarity doctrine “places the burden to establish that the 
defendant’s copying is actionable as a legal proposition on the plaintiff in a copyright-infringement 
suit, even when the copying is shown to exist as a factual matter”). 
121 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). The statute defines derivative works broadly as “work[s] based 
upon one or more preexisting works” and includes a representative catalog of examples like 
translations and abridgments. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
122 See, e.g., Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int’l Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(noting that the same substantial-similarity test applies whether the defendant’s product is analyzed 
as a reproduced work or a derivative work), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating 
that the derivative work standard examines whether the accused work “would be considered an 
infringing work if the material which it has derived from a prior work had been taken without the 
consent of a copyright proprietor of such prior work” (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation mark 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976))). 
123 See, e.g., 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09[A] 
(2017); Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. 
L. REV. 317, 334-35 (2005); Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 
1347 (2015); Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 109-10 
(2014); Lemley, supra note 3, at 1018-19. 
124 See Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 599-600 (2006). 
125 See, e.g., Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 452 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2006); Boisson v. Banian, 
Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001); Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 F.3d 
25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2001); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000); Universal 
Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975). 
126 Boisson, 273 F.3d at 272 (quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d 
Cir. 1991)). The gravitational pull of this “ordinary observer” standard traces back to the Second 
Circuit’s 1946 opinion in Arnstein v. Porter. 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). Various courts of appeals 
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In cases involving technical works like software code, by contrast, courts are 
more willing to consult technical experts. In a widely influential decision, Computer 
Associates International v. Altai, Inc., the Second Circuit concluded that the ordinary 
layperson could not make sufficient sense of code’s complexities.127 Approvingly 
quoting the lower court, it explained that “[i]n the context of computer programs, 
many of the familiar tests of similarity prove to be inadequate, for they were 
developed historically in the context of artistic and literary, rather than utilitarian, 
works.”128 Altai tells courts in software-infringement cases to abstract the program 
into various levels of generality (from overall objectives at the top all the way 
down to the object code at the bottom); filter out any uncopyrightable elements, 
including both the higher levels of abstraction as well as unprotectable details 
like public-domain material, methods of operation, and well-known 
programming techniques; and then compare the remaining expressive kernel 
with the corresponding elements in the allegedly infringing program.129 Other 
circuits have followed the Second Circuit’s lead.130 
If courts are going to invoke copyright law to decide trade secret derivation 
cases, one might have expected them to feature Altai’s dissective approach 
prominently. But they don’t. Nor do they seem to agree on whether copyright’s 
threshold for actionable similarity should be less than, more than, or the same 
as trade secrecy’s threshold. Their only common denominator is the same 
 
have put their own individual stamp on the test, though Arnstein’s factual subjectivity remains 
copyright’s touchstone for assessing legally actionable similarity. The most important of these is the 
Ninth Circuit, which has subdivided the question of similarity into “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” 
inquiries. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 1977). While the intrinsic test retains the focus on observers’ holistic impressions, the 
extrinsic test allows some degree of analytic dissection, often with the help of expert testimony. See 
Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000). Later decisions have 
acknowledged that these terms are a poor fit for the concepts they describe; the two-step analysis 
could be “more sensibly described as objective and subjective analyses of expression.” Shaw v. 
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted). 
127 See 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992) (remarking that while a reasonable-person approach “may 
well have served its purpose when the material under scrutiny was limited to art forms readily 
comprehensible and generally familiar to the average lay person . . . computer programs are likely to be 
somewhat impenetrable by lay observers—whether they be judges or juries”); see also Mark A. Lemley, 
Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 733 (2010) 
(noting the exceptionality of software cases and that “[v]irtually all the courts considering infringement 
of computer code have permitted expert testimony as to . . . the issue of improper appropriation”). 
128 Altai, 982 F.2d at 713 (quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 
558 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)). The court was careful to emphasize that it did not “intend to disturb the 
traditional role of lay observers in judging substantial similarity in copyright cases that involve the 
aesthetic arts, such as music, visual works or literature.” Id. at 713-14. For an argument that the 
literary arts have their own interpretive complexities that demand precisely such a disturbance, see 
Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2015). 
129 Altai, 982 F.2d at 706-11. 
130 See, e.g., Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 142 (5th Cir. 2004); Gates Rubber 
Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834-36 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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proposition for which other trade secret cases mention patent doctrine: that some 
nonliteral similarity can trigger liability. Never quite explained is how much. As 
a result, they do little to justify whether trade secret analysis should be looking 
to copyright doctrine, and, if so, which way that comparison would cut. 
In Comprehensive Technologies International, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc.,131 
for example, the Fourth Circuit observed in dicta that trade secrecy’s 
similarity threshold ought to be lower than copyright’s. It reasoned that a 
trade secret, unlike a copyright, affords its owner control over ideas (rather 
than merely those ideas’ expression).132 So two works “may be sufficiently 
dissimilar on the level of expression to defeat liability for copyright 
infringement, but they may be sufficiently similar on a more abstract or 
ideational level to establish liability for trade secret misappropriation.”133 
Because the computer programs at issue in the case were so radically 
dissimilar at even this more generalized “ideational” level, the court never 
had to fix the quantum of actionable similarity any more precisely than this. 
Nevertheless, it still signaled to future litigants that a trade secret owner has 
a right to control a wider range of derivatives than would a copyright owner. 
Contrast that position with the one adopted by the district court in 
Integral Systems, Inc. v. Peoplesoft, Inc.,134 another dispute over software. The 
plaintiff alleged both copyright infringement and trade secret 
misappropriation. In dismissing both claims, the court noted that the parties 
cited no authority or standard on the question of similarity in trade secret 
cases, instead relying on the same arguments they had made regarding 
copyright infringement.135 Without considering potential differences between 
the two forms of liability, the court essentially copied its noninfringement 
holding from the copyright analysis and pasted it into its trade secrecy 
analysis. “At a minimum,” it asserted, “the ‘substantial identity’ test under 
trade secret law would seem no less stringent than the ‘substantial similarity’ 
test applied under claims of infringement.”136 In the court’s view, then, the 
similarity threshold for trade secret misappropriation is at least as demanding 
of plaintiffs—perhaps even more, but certainly not less—than its copyright 
cousin. The court seemed to assume this proposition to be self-evident, 
offering no rationale for the comparison. 
Such double-duty similarity analysis also appeared in Engenium Solutions, Inc. 
v. Symphonic Technologies, Inc.137 After deciding that a jury could reasonably find 
 
131 3 F.3d 730 (4th Cir. 1993), vacated pursuant to settlement. 
132 Id. at 736 n.7. 
133 Id. 
134 No. 90-2598, 1991 WL 498874 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1991). 
135 Id. at *10. 
136 Id. at *13. 
137 924 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
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the plaintiff ’s copyrighted software to be substantially similar to the defendant’s, 
the court incorporated that finding by reference when it turned to the trade 
secrecy claim. It noted the existence of the “many similarities” that supported its 
decision not to dismiss the copyright claim, but it never considered whether 
similarity ought to be measured the same way on the trade secrecy side.138 
It’s puzzling that only these few cases so much as raise a possible copyright 
connection. It can’t be out of judges’ reasoned choice to favor patent doctrine 
or a sui generis approach in trade secrecy disputes—the reasoning simply 
never appears in a judicial decision. Courts seem unaware that the choice is 
even available. Indeed, the likeliest explanation for why these cases gesture 
toward copyright at all is simply proximity within the legal briefs. The 
plaintiff in each case had asked the court to adjudicate both copyright and 
trade secrecy claims alongside each other. Having put in the legwork to assess 
the works’ substantial similarity under copyright law, these courts may 
reflexively be applying the same analysis again for trade secrecy. 
II. DEFINING SUBSTANTIAL DERIVATION 
If there were a good reason for trade secrets to give their owners broader 
control of adaptive uses than patents or copyrights do, then we would defend 
its exceptionalism.139 But if anything, the current law gets things backwards. 
The case for narrowing an owner’s control of adaptive uses is arguably even 
stronger for trade secrets than for other areas of IP. That case revolves around 
the owner’s scope of exclusivity and the range of alternatives available to 
would-be defendants trying to avoid liability. 
Start with copyrights and patents. When a second comer can’t use 
copyrighted or patented information, a substitute is often available, even if 
imperfect. Indeed, both bodies of law contain judge-made doctrines designed to 
prevent an owner’s entitlement from growing so broad as to exhaust resources 
for downstream innovation within the field.140 Beyond limiting the scope of 
upstream entitlements, each regime in its own way tries to subsidize second 
comers’ ability to avoid infringement. Copyright doctrine, as Section II.A below 
outlines, shows special solicitude for downstream authors who use the owner’s 
work in interim drafts only to ultimately avoid it. Patent doctrine, meanwhile, 
 
138 Id. at 795-96. 
139 Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in IP Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 245, 263 
(2017) (noting that differences between IP regimes aren’t necessarily bad). 
140 See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (observing that the “primary concern driving” the jurisprudence around patentable subject 
matter is ensuring that a patent does not preempt an entire field of inventive activity); Gates Rubber 
Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing copyright’s merger 
doctrine, a “prophylactic device to ensure that courts do not unwittingly grant protection to an idea 
by granting exclusive rights to the only, or one of only a few, means of expressing that idea”). 
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tries to cabin the doctrine of equivalents to ensure that inventors’ design-around 
efforts don’t subject them to enhanced damages for willfulness if they guess 
wrong and end up infringing the patent.141 Turning from results to rhetoric, 
courts view such attempts to circumvent others’ exclusive rights as a healthy part 
of the IP system.142 Both regimes, in sum, signal that adapters are welcome.143 
Trade secrecy, by contrast, gives those adapters no such doctrinal safety 
valves—and often leaves them with far fewer meaningful choices. A popular 
refrain in misappropriation cases is that courts “cannot compel a man who 
changes employers to wipe clean the slate of his memory.”144 True enough. But 
often it seems like they’re trying to. By tying actionable “use” to the conferral 
of a commercial advantage rather than to the development of a similar product 
or process, trade secret law threatens to leave those employees with little 
alternative but to find different projects altogether.145 While other IP regimes 
celebrate designing around, trade secrecy punishes it just the same as outright 
duplication.146 Courts scold defendants who study an existing invention and 
 
141 See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(downplaying the infringer’s design-around conduct because “[o]ne of the benefits of a patent system is its 
so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus 
bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace,” and warning that “[i]t should not be discouraged 
by punitive damage awards except in cases where conduct is so obnoxious as clearly to call for them”). 
142 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly endorsed designing around as a driver of creativity and 
competition. See, e.g., TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 883 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc); 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir.) (per curiam), 
supplemented by 64 F.3d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion), rev’d on other 
grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
State Indus., 751 F.2d at 1235-36; see also James P. Marsh Corp. v. U.S. Gauge Co., 129 F.2d 161, 165 
(7th Cir. 1942) (concluding that “the patent system is working at its best” when a downstream inventor 
designs around a patent, “[f]or it is then that we have competition between a holder of a legal 
monopoly and his competitors”). While copyright cases don’t offer the same rhetorical enthusiasm, 
they still expressly permit the practice. See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 
498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Even if an alleged copy is based on a copyrighted work, ‘a defendant may 
legitimately avoid infringement by intentionally making sufficient changes in a work which would 
otherwise be regarded as substantially similar to that of the plaintiff ’s.’” (quoting Warner Bros. Inc. 
v. Am. Broad. Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1981))). 
143 We recognize that this welcome might not be as warm as some readers would like. Would 
the world be a better place if fair use were easier to prove in court, or patent claim construction less 
muddy, or if any number of other potential reforms were adopted? Maybe. But we emphasize that 
our argument is a comparative one. Studying trade secrecy can make scholars of copyright or patent 
appreciate what they already have. 
144 E.g., Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 210 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). 
145 The employer could of course try to continue to work on the project through a clean-room 
approach, without the new employee’s help. But doing so would sometimes mean that the person 
who knows the most about a particular line of research is precisely the one than can’t work on it. 
146 See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. 
v. Baldwin, 373 N.E.2d 1000, 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); see also Michael R. McGurk & Jia W. Lu, The 
Intersection of Patents and Trade Secrets, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 189, 205 (2015) (“[U]nlike 
patent cases where a defendant can design around the patent to avoid infringement, a trade secret 
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use it “as a springboard to launch [one’s] own approach,” as if that were a bug 
rather than a feature of the innovation process.147 When prior exposure to a 
trade secret gives an individual knowledge, the case law’s but-for standard of 
causation essentially tells that individual not to put that knowledge to 
commercial use.148 That cannot be the right result for innovation policy. 
To a limited degree, trade secrecy case law is already looking for outside 
guidance on how to police derivation. As the previous Part discussed, courts 
sometimes gesture toward other exclusive-rights regimes when weighing a 
defendant’s adaptive use of a plaintiff ’s secret. But these doctrinal analogies, 
when they happen at all, are almost uniformly superficial. Out of these 
analogies, judges’ favorite is patent law’s doctrine of equivalents. Patent 
practitioners, however, wouldn’t recognize much of what they saw. In trade 
secrecy’s hands, the analogy does little work beyond the bare and banal 
proposition that liability doesn’t require an absolute identity between products. 
Courts frequently evaluate trade secrecy’s unwritten scope on a gestalt basis, a 
move that contemporary patent doctrine would deem a cardinal sin.149 
Some change is needed. In this Part, we propose three of them. The first 
concerns what courts should be looking at. They should focus on the product or 
process that the defendant is actually exploiting, not on the defendant’s earlier 
steps along the way. The second and third concern what courts should be looking 
for. It’s not enough to show exploitation of some information taken from the 
plaintiff; the plaintiff must also show that the information materially contributed 
to a protectable trade secret to begin with. Finally, an owner should be entitled 
to control exploitation of that material information in reasonably foreseeable 
markets but not in remote ones that could not have been anticipated ex ante. 
There’s some precedent for a regime that looks this way. Each of our proposed 
changes resembles a corresponding feature of copyright’s infringement 
framework. To be sure, in highlighting that resemblance, we’re mindful that some 
consistencies are foolish. Our goal isn’t harmonization between exclusive-rights 
regimes for its own sake. But where a proposed rule seems justified on its 
theoretical merits, it’s still helpful to know that another regime has actually 
employed a similar rule in practice. In the following Sections, we lay out our case 
for how substantial derivation doctrine could be improved, and how certain 
copyright infringement doctrines have paved the way. 
 
defendant’s design around attempts will not suffice, because designing around a trade secret cannot 
undo the knowledge and unauthorized use of the trade secret to facilitate the design around.”). 
147 Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino, 905 F. Supp. 1205, 1232 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). The defendant in 
Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino had expressly tried to design around a former employer’s trade secret, which 
the court considered damning evidence of misappropriation. Id. 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 80–82. 
149 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997). 
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A. Intermediate and Ultimate Uses 
In many trade secret disputes, the defendant is trying to exploit the 
relevant information in precisely the same way as the plaintiff does. But in 
others, the defendant is only using the information as a step in the course of 
researching how to produce something different. Under current law, that use 
is enough for liability. The doctrine takes what Mark Lemley has called a 
“fruit of the poisonous tree” approach: a defendant’s innovation is tainted, no 
matter how different it might be, if it can ultimately be traced back to the 
plaintiff ’s secret.150 The misappropriation occurs as soon as the defendant 
mentally relies on the secret, wherever that reliance leads. 
This choice to define derivation exclusively in terms of the defendant’s 
means of innovation, not the end product or process that those means lead 
to, is the foundation of the doctrine’s overbreadth. It means that a former 
employee or business partner who continues in the same line of research 
virtually always uses the secret simply by knowing it. For all of trade-secret 
protection’s vulnerability to reverse engineering and independent 
development, it still gives owners a rock-solid right against designing around. 
As a result, the ones with the most expertise with a particular line of research 
can be the ones most restricted from working on it. 
The problem is particularly acute when the secret covers information on 
what not to do, a category commonly called “negative knowhow.” Negative 
knowhow can be costly for a firm to develop, and the UTSA considers it just 
as protectable as any other kind of valuable information.151 But it’s effectively 
a poison pill for continuing R&D beyond the originating firm without 
permission. If you’re not repeating what you know are mistakes, you’re 
benefitting—and thus, according to the prevailing standard, misappropriating. 
The substantial derivation framework could avoid this sprawling scope by 
focusing instead on the defendant’s commercial end, rather than the R&D means 
along the way. Under that test, just as under the current one, the defendant would 
be liable if it winds up exploiting a similar asset, whether a product like a chemical 
 
150  Lemley, supra note 139, at 263. 
151 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (explaining that the 
Act’s definition of trade secrets “includes information that has commercial value from a negative 
viewpoint, for example the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process 
will not work” (emphasis omitted)). This category of trade secrets is controversial among some 
commentators concerned about forcing people down alleys they already know to be blind. See, e.g., 
Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 388 
(2007) (“Perhaps the strangest theory of trade secret law is the concept of negative know-how, a theory 
under which an employee who resigns and joins a different business can be liable for not repeating the 
mistakes and failures of his or her former employer.”); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) 
Secrets: Knowledge Networks as Innovation Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1595-96 (2017) 
(arguing that “in complex fields with a background epistemic community,” negative knowhow shouldn’t 
be eligible for protection and instead be treated as general skills and experience). 
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formula or a process like a manufacturing technique.152 It would not be liable, 
however, if the product or process that is develops is sufficiently different 
(defining that sufficiency is an issue that we take up in the next two Sections). 
That redirected focus would promote healthier competition. Trade 
secrecy rightfully worries that others’ exploitation of secrets could reduce an 
owner’s output or induce wasteful self-help on surveillance. But merely 
drawing on a secret while researching other potential investments isn’t yet 
exploitation. It’s a search for something to exploit. If that search doesn’t 
ultimately generate a similar good or method, the only potential advantage 
that the secret has bestowed on a would-be defendant is inspiration. 
Of course, a trade secret owner might not want to give inspiration away 
for free. It incurs a private cost if it strengthens or hastens its competitors’ 
successes. We can’t rule out the theoretical possibility that, at the margins, 
those costs would dissuade a firm from investing in socially beneficial 
information. But that reed is far too slim. Even under a regime that excluded 
intermediate uses, owners would still continue to wield a legal right over how 
others ultimately extract value from secrets. We doubt that a critical mass 
would significantly alter its behavior simply because it couldn’t also wield an 
equivalent right over every good idea that those secrets beget. Trade secrecy, 
like any other IP regime, need not and should not aspire to let owners capture 
every ounce of spillover value that they generate.153 
Adopting a proposal that effectively eliminates use of negative knowhow 
as a basis for liability may sound like a radical shakeup. But our proposal is 
actually more modest than it might seem. It doesn’t demand tossing out 
negative knowhow as an eligible category of trade secrets altogether. Claims 
based on wrongful acquisition or unauthorized disclosure would remain just as 
viable as they ever were. Only an alleged misappropriation of negative 
knowhow based solely on use would fail. Even under current law, few if any 
cases have involved a successful misappropriation claim based on such a 
theory.154 And before the UTSA, courts typically did not consider negative 
knowhow to be a trade secret at all.155 The viability of a standalone claim for 
 
152 See, e.g., Proline Prods., L.L.C. v. McBride, 324 P.3d 430, 433 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014) 
(holding the defendant liable for misappropriating a secret formula for an asphalt cold-patch 
additive, despite his efforts to design around it, because he had merely swapped in an ingredient 
“with the same characteristics” as the one he had taken out). 
153 See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
154 Cases involving negative knowhow almost always involve some accompanying positive 
knowhow as well. We have yet to find any published case in a UTSA jurisdiction where a 
misappropriation claim was based solely on the use of negative knowhow. 
155 See Graves, supra note 151, at 394 & n.11 (“[M]ost courts ruling in trade secret cases from 
the period before the Uniform Trade Secrets Act was adopted, and in those states which today still 
apply the 1939 Restatement, refused to recognize trade secrets in negative know-how or to hold 
defendants liable for not repeating a plaintiff ’s mistakes.”). 
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using negative knowhow has thus remained largely untested.156 Given that lay 
of the land, we don’t see the elimination of these claims as unsettling much for 
eligible subject matter. At the very least, we think it is worth the bargain of 
freeing potential defendants from the unrealistic expectation that they must 
repeat known failures to continue work on a particular line of research.157 
One argument in favor of trade secrecy’s current strictness, which Lemley 
has recently advanced, is that misappropriation is harder to detect than other 
forms of IP infringement and so is bound to go underenforced.158 Adequate 
deterrence, the theory goes, would therefore demand that a plaintiff be able 
to target not only direct exploitation but also downstream adaptations that 
benefited in some way from familiarity with the secret at the start. 
We agree that underenforcement can be a problem.159 But we’re skeptical 
that targeting materially different adaptations is a good solution. If the goal is 
to make up for unobserved violations by ramping up deterrence of any 
observed violations, it’s not clear why adapters as a group are the ones best 
suited to pay for that shortfall. Instead, policymakers could, for instance, 
increase the available damages for plain-vanilla, direct exploitation of the 
secret.160 Indeed, trade secret law already allows courts to disgorge a 
 
156 And, on the federal side, the DTSA’s “use in interstate commerce” requirement that brings 
the law within Congress’s Commerce Clause power, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2012), arguably makes 
negative knowhow ineligible for protection as a constitutional matter. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra 
note 34, at 894 (“[T]here does not seem to be any basis to argue that so-called ‘negative information’ 
can be protected under the DTSA, as negative information is not normally in use.”). 
157 Cf. Novell Inc. v. Timpanagos Research Grp. Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197, 1216-17 (Utah 
Dist. Ct. 1998) (enjoining preliminarily the defendants under an inevitable disclosure theory because 
“it is inconceivable to believe that if they are designing a product similar to [the plaintiff ’s] that they 
ever would start down any of the blind alleys that they already know won’t work” and commenting 
that “[n]o one is going to spend money trying that which they already know will end in failure”). 
158 Lemley, supra note 139, at 266-67. 
159 We’re unsure, though, whether it’s a significantly bigger problem than underenforcement 
in copyright, where enforcement is also notoriously difficult. Cf. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, 
An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 
1655-56, 1659 (1998) (surmising that acts of copyright infringement are more likely to go undetected 
than violations of patent, trademark, and trade secret law, but acknowledging the absence of 
“rigorous empirical studies” and questioning the feasibility of any such study “given the impossibility 
of monitoring every possible act of infringement”). 
160 That at least is a theory underlying copyright’s statutory damages regime, which permits 
plaintiffs to recover more than the actual damages they would be able to prove at trial. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504(c); Blair & Cotter, supra note 159, at 1656 (conjecturing that copyright’s “statutory damages 
rule provides a response to the potential underenforcement problem” by “provid[ing] the owner with 
a greater incentive to detect violations and to enforce his rights than would otherwise exist”). 
Relatedly, an extensive law-and-economics literature has argued that multiplied damages can reduce 
underdetection and underenforcement problems. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, 
LAW & ECONOMICS 260-61 (6th ed. 2012) (arguing that “[t]he efficiency loss due to enforcement 
error can be offset by augmenting compensatory damages with punitive damages” that “equal the 
inverse of the enforcement error”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (1998) (“When an injurer has a chance of escaping 
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defendant’s unjust enrichment and to double a damages award where the 
defendant has acted willfully.161 Courts might also equitably calculate damages 
based on a period even longer than that strictly necessary to erase a defendant’s 
head start from the misappropriation.162 Once the legal system has identified 
a class of defendants that ought to remedy a plaintiff ’s harms, it can modulate 
the severity of those remedies to mitigate any underenforcement shortfall. 
It’s far from clear that adapters trying to design around the trade secret 
owner’s entitlement should be part of that class. On the contrary, they’re engaged 
in an innovation process that the legal system ought to encourage, and indeed 
does encourage when the governing IP regime happens to be copyright or 
patent.163 Lemley essentially acknowledges as much, qualifying any defense of 
trade secrecy’s current approach with the important caveat that the law “should 
limit the reach of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine where the defendant’s 
product or process is sufficiently changed from the misappropriated one.”164 
Copyright law already adopts a version of what we’re proposing. In a 
garden-variety copyright infringement case, the work that is alleged to be 
embodied in an illicit copy is the same work that the defendant is exploiting. 
But sometimes the relevant copy is merely preliminary, a means toward a 
noninfringing end. How strictly courts scrutinize such so-called “intermediate 
copying” depends somewhat, like the substantial similarity standard itself, on 
the type of work at issue. But even at its strictest, copyright law gives such 
defendants an easier path than it would in a case of direct exploitation.165 
When the work at issue is an artistic one like a novel, play, or film, courts 
generally allow second comers to make undistributed copies in the course of 
making a noninfringing work. This categorical approach allows a writer to 
produce initial drafts that tread closely on a copyrighted predecessor so long as 
the final draft is not substantially similar to it.166 As the Ninth Circuit once 
 
liability, the proper level of total damages to impose on him, if he is found liable, is the harm caused 
multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of being found liable.” (emphasis omitted)). 
161 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B)(i)(II), (C) (Supp. 2017); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a), (b) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
162 See Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, C.A. No. 3512-VCS, 2010 WL 610725, at *27 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 18, 2010) (running equitably a lost profits calculation beyond the head-start period necessary to 
cover compensatory and unjust enrichment damages in order to “prevent underenforcement and to 
remedy the defendant’s increased market share”). 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 140–43. 
164 Lemley, supra note 139, at 269. 
165 See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 118, § 2:7. 
166 See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 299 (6th Cir. 2004) (“In deciding 
infringement claims, courts have held that only the version of the alleged infringing work presented to 
the public should be considered.”); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The only discovery 
plaintiff suggests is the production of early drafts of defendant’s play on the theory they might reflect 
copying from plaintiff ’s play that was disguised or deleted in later drafts. Copying deleted or so 
disguised as to be unrecognizable is not copying.”); Flaherty, v. Filardi, No. 03-2167, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
 
1084 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1051 
explained, merely making “working copies” is insufficient to trigger liability 
because “[c]opyright law’s prohibition against ‘copying’ does not prevent a 
subsequent author from making photocopies to use solely as source material.”167 
An important reason for this permissiveness is that others’ intermediate 
copying doesn’t tend to decrease authors’ incentives to invest in creating 
artistic works.168 The work’s commercial value depends on the expression that 
readers consume. Private drafts don’t compete with published works. Only 
other published ones do. 
If the work at issue is software, courts typically undertake a more exacting 
inquiry. In cases where a software developer has reverse engineered object code to 
develop a noninfringing program that can interoperate with it, courts have been 
receptive to the premise that intermediate copies can trigger liability.169 That 
doesn’t mean, however, that these defendants will actually end up liable—just that 
they’ll have more work to do to avoid it. Rather than handing reverse engineers 
an outright safe harbor, this line of cases has made them mount a fair use defense. 
To prevail, a defendant must show that it had to copy the protected code to access 
 
LEXIS 69202, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2007) (dismissing a copyright claim over interim drafts of a 
published, noninfringing final work); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (refusing to consider earlier drafts of a screenplay because “[t]he [c]ourt considers the works as 
they were presented to the public”); Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 724 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (“[I]nfringement must be the film as produced and broadcast, we do not consider the preliminary 
scripts.”); PATRY, supra note 118, § 9:78 (observing that similarities to a defendant’s interim version of 
a work are “irrelevant to the ultimate question of substantial similarity: that determination rests solely 
upon a comparison of the plaintiff ’s work and the defendant’s final version”). 
167 Stone v. Perpetual Motion, LLC, 87 F. App’x 51, 52 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). 
168 See, e.g., OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 118, § 2:7 (“[T]he real harm to the copyright 
owner is not that the defendant created a draft that involved substantial copying, but that the 
defendant is selling his final version to the public . . . .”); Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant 
Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 1635-36 (2009) (“[I]nfringement requires at least some potential 
interference with the copyright owner’s expectation of exclusivity. . . . Intermediate scripts that never 
see the light of day do not communicate the author’s original expression to the public and thus cannot 
constitute copyright infringement.”). 
169 See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that “intermediate copying of computer object code may infringe [an owner’s copyright] regardless 
of whether the end product of the copying also infringes those rights”); see also NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 123, § 13.05 (observing that when a reverse engineer reproduces protected code, 
“[t]he copy generated is merely preliminary to further uses, but intermediate copying is no less an 
infringement of the copyright owner’s exclusive reproduction right than is ‘final’ copying”). District 
courts have essentially quarantined the categorical intermediate copying defense to artistic works. 
See, e.g., Esplanade Prods., Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 17-2185, 2017 WL 5635027, at *18 (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 8, 2017) (finding itself “unable to locate a single case in which the Sega ‘intermediate copying’ 
theory has been extended to impose liability based upon the copying of non-software-related 
work . . . in the course of creating a [dissimilar] work,” and therefore rejecting an infringement claim 
over preliminary versions of a screenplay); Quirk v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, No. 11-3773, 2013 WL 
1345075, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013) (refusing to extend intermediate copying liability to cases 
“involving alleged copying of books, scripts, or literary characters” rather than code). For a detailed 
comparison of these two lines of cases, see OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 118, § 2:7. 
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some unprotected elements within it.170 Even in the cases employing this closer 
scrutiny, the outcomes for software developers accused of intermediate copying 
have generally been good ones.171 The fair use analysis tries to ensure that a 
defendant’s interim copies aren’t enabling direct competition in the plaintiff ’s 
primary market, and often enough they aren’t.172 
Putting it all together, whether through a carveout from the prima facie 
infringement standard at the front end of a case or through fair use at the 
back end, copyright law is generally tolerant of internal-facing derivatives 
that form the launching pad for public-facing originals.173 A copy that might 
have been otherwise actionable becomes benign when it generates later 
creation and never itself enters into the plaintiff ’s markets. 
The same principle should apply in trade secrecy cases. Unfortunately, 
courts can’t pay such close attention to the defendant’s final product or process 
if they are going to base the liability decision exclusively on the defendant’s 
R&D activities. To make room for such result-to-result comparisons, courts 
must tolerate internal uses of another’s trade secrets when the outcome ends 
up different enough—even if that use helps the defendant along the way. 
 
170 See, e.g., Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519. 
171 See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99-7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (denying a preliminary injunction), aff ’d, 2001 WL 51509 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 2001); 
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519; see also Sag, supra note 168, at 1638 (“[I]n the case of computer software, the 
intermediate copying required for reverse engineering has invariably been found to constitute fair use.”); 
cf. Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996) (endorsing Sega’s conclusion that 
“reverse engineering may be a fair use”); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that “[w]hen the nature of a work requires intermediate copying to 
understand the ideas and processes in a copyrighted work, that nature supports a fair use for intermediate 
copying” but still rejecting the defendants’ fair use argument because they had “purloined” the copy that 
they had reverse engineered). Contrast these cases with DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 
(D.D.C. 2007), a rare example of a litigated case where intermediate copying of code failed the fair use 
test. The defendant copied the plaintiff ’s database schema in order to write scripts that would migrate 
the data into its own competing product. Id. at 83. Because the copying was performed by a “direct 
competitor” that “wanted to create a product similar to [the plaintiff ’s] that contained many of the same 
features,” the court refused to deem it fair use. Id. 
172 As Matthew Sag has argued, a focus on commercial value can explain copyright’s different 
treatment of scripts and software. See Sag, supra note 168, at 1636-38. Code, unlike literary texts that 
communicate directly to an audience, derives its value from how it enables machines to function. 
See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2316 (1994). Noncommunicative uses of software can threaten real market 
harm to a copyright owner in a way that noncommunicative uses of literature cannot. 
173 Cf. Lemley, supra note 139, at 260 (describing copyright law’s rejection of a “fruit of the poisonous 
tree” approach insofar as it “goes out of its way to treat even . . . intermediate use as non-infringing in 
many circumstances if it results in the production of a non-infringing work”). 
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B. Materiality 
Once courts are focused on the asset that the defendant is exploiting instead 
of intermediate research steps, what should they be looking for? Here, again, we 
think that current case law is misfiring. It cares too much about the fact that a 
defendant used some elements of the plaintiff ’s secret and not enough about the 
importance of the particular elements used. What’s missing is a materiality filter. 
In theory, the Restatement’s substantial derivation standard exempts a 
defendant’s adaptations when the contribution of a plaintiff ’s trade secret is 
“slight.” But as discussed in Part I, a number of courts have essentially treated 
the universe of slight derivations as a null set.174 They impose liability on 
defendants who were exposed to the trade secret without considering whether 
they had incorporated only a trivial aspect of it or something that could have 
been easily recreated from public-domain materials. 
Substantial derivation shouldn’t just be a question of whether but also how 
much. Simply copying something from the trade secret as a factual matter 
shouldn’t automatically require liability as a legal matter. In cases like Smith, 
Rohm & Hass, and Affiliated Hospital Products, the defendant had all but lost the 
case after admitting the fact of use—even though much (or all) of the 
information used was publicly available and thus unprotectable.175 And the 
handful of cases that have actually asked “how much?” have tended to focus 
narrowly on quantitative similarity, never specifying why particular quantities 
ought to matter. Cases such as Bishop, Reingold, and Dresser recite numerical 
metrics as a proxy for materiality—the number of components in a process or 
feet in the length of a boat hull.176 But they don’t tell us anything qualitative. 
How many feet of a boat hull is substantial, anyway? Numbers alone, missing 
a factual context for assessing what the numbers mean, can’t answer whether 
the defendant took a significant feature of the plaintiff ’s trade secret. 
To evaluate that qualitative context, courts should start by dissecting the 
plaintiff ’s secret into protectable and unprotectable elements.177 Trade secret 
subject matter, while broad,178 excludes information that is described in prior 
 
174 See supra Section I.B; see also Graves, supra note 151, at 404 (“There appear to be no cases 
applying the [Restatement’s] modification rule but finding that a defendant’s modifications were 
sufficiently transformative to avoid liability.”). 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 57–63. 
176 See supra text accompanying notes 83–91. 
177 While the question of whether information qualifies as a trade secret is typically one of fact, 
there are still “instances where information may be deemed not to be a trade secret as a matter of 
law.” MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 15.01. As the line between protectable and unprotectable 
information can be “extraordinarily difficult . . . to draw,” the task of dissection is appropriate for 
courts, not juries. Lemley, supra note 127, at 741. 
178 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (establishing that trade 
secret subject matter includes “a formula, pattern, . . . or process”). Because trade secret law 
encompasses processes and methods while copyright does not, where a plaintiff brings both copyright 
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publications, generally known within an industry, readily ascertainable from 
commercialized products,179 or attributable to an employee’s prior skill and 
expertise.180 Some of these unprotectable elements, like published information, 
may be easier to identify and extricate than others.181 But all have been excluded 
from trade secrecy’s purview in order to promote cumulative innovation and 
protect employee mobility.182 Courts undermine that policy goal by reinserting 
at the misappropriation stage what has been withheld at the protectability stage. 
In cases where there are few protectable elements, a materiality filter 
would screen out claims unless the trade secret and the defendant’s product 
bore an especially high degree of similarity to each other. Such cases will 
typically involve secrets covering combinations or compilations, where the 
only protectable aspect is the precise selection of publicly known information. 
Requiring factfinders to ask whether the defendant actually put that selection 
to use would prevent plaintiffs from effectively laundering public-domain 
information into exclusivity by incorporating it into a compilation.183 
 
and trade secret claims related to software, the copying of more abstract levels may be permissible 
under the copyright claim but not the trade secret claim. See, e.g., GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG 
U.S., Inc., 836 F.3d 477, 498 (5th Cir. 2016) (explaining that trade secret law would prohibit the 
copying of broader levels of abstraction, such as “the organizational structure of a software system”). 
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012) (defining “trade secret” to exclude “information . . . generally 
known to, and . . . readily ascertainable by proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value 
from [its] disclosure or use”); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (same). 
180 See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 432 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he 
‘general knowledge, skill and experience’ gained by an employee during his employment cannot be 
claimed as a trade secret by his employer.”); Micro Consulting, Inc. v. Zubeldia, 813 F. Supp. 1514, 
1536 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (“[A] person has the right to use ideas generally known . . . and may combine 
with such general knowledge his own abilities and his knowledge of the customs of the market, the 
methods of obtaining business and all other factors which affect his particular field and to compete 
with his former employer.”), aff ’d mem., 959 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision). 
Nor does trade secret protection prevent the defendant from learning the same information from an 
unrelated third party—for example, through a separate licensing agreement. See Penalty Kick Mgmt. 
Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
181 Finding published information, such as patents, may be fairly straightforward. But finding 
information that is tacit or readily ascertainable from inspecting commercial products often requires 
further expert testimony and guidance—an inquiry complicated by legal uncertainty over what is or isn’t 
“readily ascertainable.” See, e.g., Celeritas Techs. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp. 150 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“California law appears somewhat unsettled regarding whether a trade secret enters the public domain 
when it is ‘readily ascertainable’ or whether it must also be ‘actually ascertained’ by the public.”). 
Disentangling a departing employee’s skill and expertise from a protectable trade secret can be particularly 
cumbersome for courts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 reporters’ 
note cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (listing cases “illustrating the difficulties inherent in distinguishing the 
general skill and knowledge of a former employee from the trade secrets of a former employer”). 
182 See supra Section I.A. 
183 See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co., 689 F.2d at 432-34 (suggesting that a defendant could not use a 
process for making latex paint that was “practically similar” to that of the plaintiff ’s process, despite 
the fact that “most if not all of the elements of plaintiff ’s [p]rocess were ‘long and widely known in 
the trade’” and the plaintiff did not have to specifically define its trade secret during litigation); 
Cont’l Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 442-43 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that a sales 
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A materiality filter is particularly important given trade secrecy law’s low 
threshold for establishing validity. The doctrine imposes no real novelty or 
originality requirement, encompassing almost any information with potential 
commercial value that a putative owner can keep secret.184 This is why even a 
confidential compilation of publicly known information could be protected.185 A 
low validity threshold increases pressure on the infringement analysis to tailor 
the scope of the right to the owner’s inventive contribution.186 Too expansive a 
concept of actionable use risks turning the legal right into, as Lemley puts it, “a 
standardless, free-roaming right to sue competitors for business conduct that 
courts or juries might be persuaded to deem objectionable.”187 A low validity 
threshold combined with a similarity standard that lacks any normative criterion 
often pushes in the direction of overprotection.188 
One rare trade secrecy case that followed the right route is American Can 
Co. v. Mansukhani.189 The Seventh Circuit dissected the plaintiff ’s alleged 
 
manual narrowly qualified as a trade secret, even though it was a combination of publicly available 
materials, because the plaintiff ’s unique “decisions to include and exclude elements from a larger 
pool of data. . . . may contain a sufficient degree of novelty, however slight, to be excluded from 
general knowledge,” yet then assessing the defendant’s use of any “information contained in its sales 
manuals” rather than use of the exact combination (emphasis added)). But see Callaway Golf Co. v. 
Dunlop Slazenger Grp. Ams., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 457, 462 (D. Del. 2004) (focusing the use inquiry 
on whether the defendant had used the “unique combination” of “commonly known ingredients in 
the industry” that plaintiff claimed as its secret). 
184 See, e.g., BladeRoom Grp. Ltd. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 15-1370, 2018 WL 514923, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) (“In a broad sense, a trade secret ‘consists of any unpatented idea which may be 
used for industrial and commercial purposes.’”); see also Varadarajan, supra note 21, at 1410 (comparing 
trade secret law’s minimal substantive requirements with patent law’s more rigorous ones). 
185 See, e.g., Penalty Kick, 318 F.3d at 1291 (observing that “a unique combination” or compilation 
of publicly available information may qualify as a trade secret); Sikes v. McGraw-Edison Co., 665 F.2d 
731, 736 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[A] trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics and components, 
each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the unified process, design and operation of which 
in unique combination, affords a competitive advantage and is a protectable secret.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 
743 (2d Cir. 1965))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (AM. LAW 
INST. 1995) (“The fact that some or all of the components of the trade secret are well-known does not 
preclude protection for a secret combination, compilation, or integration of the individual elements.”). 
186 Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2230 
(2016) (“[An] approach, which focuses very little on the validity stage and treats the limiting 
doctrines as inputs into the infringement analysis, puts tremendous pressure on courts to tailor the 
scope of rights in a work at the infringement stage. As courts typically recognize, the scope of 
protection to which an author is entitled is supposed to match the size of her original contribution.”). 
187 Lemley, supra note 28, at 343-44; see also Protexol Corp. v. Koppers Co., 229 F.2d 635, 637 
(2d Cir. 1956) (rejecting a view of improper use that would prevent “anyone receiving a trade secret 
[from] thereafter experiment[ing] with the ingredients therein, even though their use for the 
purpose had been well known for years,” because “[s]uch a result is not only unnecessary for the 
promotion of business morality, but offensive to the sound policy of promoting technical progress”). 
188 Often, though not always. As discussed previously, courts may also underprotect if they discount 
the qualitative importance of quantitatively small usage. See supra text accompanying notes 89–91. 
189 742 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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secret, identified its many unprotectable elements, required heightened 
similarity to account for the “extremely narrow” scope of protection, and 
seemed to demand some level of qualitative similarity.190 In evaluating 
whether the defendant’s new commercial jet inks were sufficiently similar to 
the ones he had developed while working for the plaintiff, the court explained 
that prior published information, industry knowledge, and the defendant’s 
high level of skill as a chemist significantly narrowed the scope of the 
plaintiff ’s entitlement.191 The court cautioned that any similarity analysis 
comparing the products could not “los[e] sight of the original limitations on 
the plaintiff ’s trade secrets.”192 More than functional similarity, it stressed, 
“was required where the public information and defendant’s own knowledge 
confined so narrowly the scope of the valid trade secrets.”193 
A few other cases have reached similar results.194 But given trade secrecy’s 
lack of a coherent approach for assessing the materiality of a defendant’s use, 
even courts that get the right result are all over the map in terms of how they 
get there. Regardless of which party wins, many trade secrecy cases recite a 
very broad definition of actionable use that counsels those with prior 
exposure to a trade secret to avoid similar research paths altogether.195 
Once again, copyright’s infringement framework provides a helpful proof 
of concept. In formulating the test that would eventually become copyright’s 
modern substantial similarity standard, the Second Circuit announced in 
Arnstein v. Porter that “adequate proof . . . of copying . . . is not enough; for 
there can be ‘permissible copying,’ copying which is not illicit.”196 Copying as 
a factual matter does not lead to a conclusion of infringement as a legal 
 
190 Id. at 329-31. 
191 See id. at 329-30 (explaining that “the scope of American Can’s trade secrets was extremely 
narrow—the protected secrets are limited to the precise proportions of ingredients which are 
themselves already in the public domain” and that “Mansukhani has substantial skill, knowledge and 
experience in formulating commercial jet inks, [which] he is entitled to use . . . to compete against 
American Can” (emphasis omitted)). 
192 Id. at 331. 
193 Id. 
194 See, e.g., Penalty Kick v. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Cola Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(emphasizing that the defendant must use a “substantial portion of the secret” for liability and engaging 
in a process of comparison akin to analytic dissection); Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Grp. 
Ams., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215 (D. Del. 2004) (concluding that there was no actionable “use” of 
plaintiff ’s trade secret because any commonalities between the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s golf ball 
technologies related to information “commonly known in the industry” or described in prior patents); 
Berry v. Glidden Co., 92 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (“It is not enough that defendant used what 
plaintiff imparted to it in confidence. Before defendant can be restrained from, or held to account for, 
such use plaintiff must further establish that he disclosed something novel to the defendant.”). 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 72–82. 
196 154 F.2d 464, 472 (2d Cir. 1946) (footnote omitted). 
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matter.197 The doctrine separates the inquiry into two distinct questions. One 
is strictly objective. It asks whether, as a matter of historical fact, the 
defendant actually copied anything from the plaintiff. The other is normative, 
assessing the significance of any copying that actually occurred. 
A copyright, like a trade secret, is easy to get.198 Unlike a trade secret, 
however, it isn’t always effective against a nonliteral copyist. In many 
copyright cases, the factual question of whether copying occurred is conceded 
altogether; what’s disputed is the materiality of that copying. 
As part of the normative half of the copying analysis, courts emphasize that 
using a fragment of a larger work won’t trigger liability unless it is qualitatively 
significant. As the Second Circuit put it, “the quantitative analysis of two works 
must always occur in the shadow of their qualitative nature.”199 While a large 
quantity of copying will always push in favor of an infringement finding, a small 
quantity cannot except if it’s genuinely important to the plaintiff ’s work. 
To enable that assessment of qualitative significance, courts will often break 
down the plaintiff ’s work into its constituent elements and dissect its individual 
similarities and dissimilarities with the defendant’s work. This dissective 
approach is most prevalent in disputes over software and other technical 
materials, the subject matter most analogous to what’s involved in typical trade 
secret cases.200 Thinking about the plaintiff ’s work as a combination of smaller 
features, rather than an abstract whole, allows a court to filter out its 
unprotectable features and center the similarity analysis on whatever remains. 
If little protectable expression remains after dissecting the plaintiff ’s 
work, then a court may raise the similarity threshold that triggers liability. To 
infringe in such cases, a defendant’s work must be not only substantially 
similar but “virtually identical” to the copyrighted work.201 Demanding this 
 
197 See TufAmerica, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 67 F. Supp. 3d 590, 598-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(critiquing a plaintiff who had asked the court to “find qualitative significance simply because 
defendants have actually copied its work” because such reasoning would “improperly conflate[] 
factual copying and actionable copying”). 
198 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (describing 
copyright’s low threshold for protectability). 
199 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1999); see 
also TufAmerica, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 596 (“[T]he qualitative significance prong of the substantial 
similarity test . . . in many ways is more important than its quantitative counterpart.”). 
200 See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992); see also 
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 186, at 2235 (noting that courts are “most eager” to allow dissection, 
rather than strictly comparing works as a whole, in software cases). But even cases dealing with more 
traditionally artistic works sometimes go this route as well. See, e.g., Tiseo Architects, Inc. v. B & B 
Pools Serv. & Supply Co., 495 F.3d 344, 344 (6th Cir. 2007) (architectural design drawings); Kohus 
v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855-56 (6th Cir. 2003) (latch design drawings); Yankee Candle Co. v. 
Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 F.3d 25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2001) (label designs). 
201 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If there’s a 
wide range of expression . . . then copyright protection is ‘broad’ and a work will infringe if it’s 
‘substantially similar’ to the copyrighted work. If there’s only a narrow range of expression . . . then 
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higher degree of similarity gives a work a thinner level of protection, 
reflecting the fact its author had not contributed much original expression to 
it in the first place.202 Under the banner of this “thinness” standard, copyright 
law goes easier on defendants who copy a protected compilation of 
individually unprotectable facts than those who copy, say, a novel or a 
painting.203 Indeed, even in decisions that have engaged in a holistic 
comparison rather than a dissective one, courts have stressed that the presence 
of unprotectable elements requires a “more refined analysis” that ensures that 
the alleged similarity is “between those elements, and only those elements, 
that provide copyrightability to the allegedly infringed compilation.”204 
If a court assessing a trade secret claim is looking for a way to ensure that an 
alleged substantial derivation is actually substantial, the basics of copyright’s 
two-sided approach is a decent fit. We really do mean the basics here—we’ve left 
out many of the flawed details of how copyright structures its materiality 
framework in litigation.205 We don’t think that copyright has all the right answers, 
but it has some. One of the most fundamental, which trade secret cases are 
currently missing, is that some copying is simply too insubstantial to penalize. 
C. Foreseeable Markets 
Even if the copied information was material to the plaintiff ’s project, a 
misappropriation defendant may be using it to exploit a very different market. 
In Collelo v. Geographic Services, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia held a defendant liable even though no reasonable jury could have 
found that the defendant had taken the secret “to do the work that that secret 
 
copyright protection is ‘thin’ and a work must be ‘virtually identical’ to infringe.” (citation omitted)); 
Nihon, 166 F.3d at 71 (concluding that where “the copyrighted work contains both original and 
unprotected elements, a higher quantity of copying is required to support a finding of substantial 
similarity than when the infringed work is wholly original”); TransWestern Publ’g Co. LP v. 
Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133. F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[M]ore similarity is required when 
less protectible matter is at issue. Thus, if substantial similarity is the normal measure required to 
demonstrate infringement, ‘supersubstantial’ similarity must pertain when dealing with ‘thin’ works.” 
(quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1997))). 
202 See Balganesh, supra note 120, at 207 (“Thickness operates as a direct measure of the 
copyright entitlement’s exclusionary robustness. The thicker the entitlement, the greater the forms 
and types of copying that are likely to be actionable; conversely, the thinner the entitlement, the 
fewer the forms and types of copying that are considered actionable.”). 
203 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350. 
204 Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation mark omitted) 
(quoting Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
205 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 270 (2014) 
(showing through lab experiments with lay jurors that knowledge of actual copying often infects 
factfinders’ perceptions of materiality); Lemley, supra note 127, at 740 (arguing that dissective 
analysis isn’t used as often as it should be); Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1827 (same). 
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was designed for.”206 The trial court had found “no evidence whatsoever” that 
the parties were competing or “even doing the same work.”207 Cases like Collelo 
highlight the question of whether differences in commercial usage ever matter 
when, in a vacuum, the products themselves are similar. The court said no. 
But the common law of unfair competition, from which the particulars of 
trade secret law first evolved, says yes. Recovery for misappropriation 
requires some direct competition.208 Outside the plaintiff ’s relevant markets, 
all competition is fair.209 
One could conceivably argue that trade secrecy law should return to its 
roots by reinvigorating a direct competition requirement and then call it a day. 
But if one justifies trade secrets as IP incentives, as we do, then the analysis 
cannot stop there. A relevant markets criterion needs some specification as to 
which markets are relevant. Unfortunately, misappropriation doctrine skips 
that question entirely.210 The market that the firm is actually operating in is a 
good start. Were it the end as well, though, R&D investment could take a 
serious hit. A firm may invest in developing socially valuable information not 
only based on a primary commercial use that it exploits immediately, but also 
based on anticipated potential value in a derivative market yet to come. 
Deeming such revenue streams irrelevant to trade secret protection risks 
distorting or even eliminating those investments. Asking courts to look for 
competition in similar markets is thus, while necessary, still insufficient. There 
has to be a framework for assessing which markets a plaintiff may even bring 
to the table before they can be compared to the defendant’s. 
In this Section, we offer a rough sketch of such a framework grounded in 
the notion of foreseeable markets. Under our proposed standard, a 
defendant’s adaptation of secret information should be actionable only if, as 
of the time of the secret’s development, either the plaintiff actually foresaw, 
or a reasonable firm in the plaintiff ’s industry would have foreseen, the 
commercial use at issue. If not, the adaptation should be permitted. 
 
206 727 S.E.2d 55, 61 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
207 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
208 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
1995) (“Appeals to the misappropriation doctrine are almost always rejected when the appropriation 
does not intrude upon the plaintiff ’s primary market. Only rarely have courts applied the doctrine 
to appropriations of intangible trade values for use in secondary or derivative markets.”). 
209 See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass’n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1038 (3d Cir. 
1984) (“[The] use of information in competition with the creator outside of its primary market . . . falls 
outside the scope of the misappropriation doctrine, since the public interest in free access outweighs 
the public interest in providing an additional incentive to the creator or gatherer of information.”). 
210 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 419, 472-73 (2011) (“Despite its avowed importance, no court has to date offered a 
meaningful test or approach to applying the [relevant markets] requirement. The dominant 
approach appears to involve courts adopting a largely intuitive understanding of both direct 
competition and the primary market that the parties operate in.”). 
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Within the common law, a foreseeability limitation has an excellent 
pedigree. From tort law’s proximate causation to contract law’s doctrine of 
impossibility, courts have tried to cabin liability when an intervening event 
genuinely cannot be anticipated.211 The classic economic justification for 
these rules is that people are incentivized to act today by the subjective 
probabilities that they assign to possible outcomes tomorrow. If someone 
foresees a risk of loss, she will conform her behavior to avoid it if the costs of 
doing so don’t outweigh the risk-adjusted benefits. Law can modulate that 
behavior by adding costs or benefits to the equation. In the textbook 
negligence example, a company that might not have otherwise decided to 
invest in preventing loss to others would do so if the expected value of an 
eventual damages payout outweighs the expected value of the investment. 
The threat of liability thus encourages a higher level of care.212 
People make these ex ante decisions based on the possible scenarios that they 
can forecast. Events that they cannot reasonably predict cannot do much to 
incentivize people to change their behavior. If a law is meant to affect individuals’ 
cost–benefit calculations, it shouldn’t need to consider future outcomes that those 
individuals wouldn’t (or couldn’t) have considered themselves.213 
Restricting an exclusive-rights entitlement’s scope to a foreseeable range of 
commercial uses limits the owner’s rewards to those that are genuinely likely to 
influence its investments. IP protection isn’t costless, of course, driving up prices 
for consumers and follow-on creators.214 If society is going to provide it, it should 
gain more than it gives up. Limiting owners’ control to reasonably foreseeable 
 
211 For additional examples, see Shymakrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1594-1600 (2009). 
212 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 246-47 (1987). 
213 See Balganesh, supra note 211, at 1592 (“The law recognizes that . . . events that are incapable 
of being anticipated—and consequently [their] costs and benefits . . .—are likely to have little 
influence on their decisions. It thus characterizes them as unforeseeable, in the recognition that they 
form no part of individuals’ ex ante incentives for action.”); see also Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1489, 1492 (1999) (“Societal capture of windfalls, by definition, does not affect incentives to 
engage in productive activity and therefore does not discourage effort or enterprise.”). 
214 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 35-37 (2006) (“From the perspective of a society’s overall 
welfare, the most efficient thing would be for those who possess information to give it away for 
free—or rather, for the cost of communicating it . . . . On any given day, enforcing copyright law 
leads to inefficient underutilization of copyrighted information.”). One of us has argued that this 
second cost, in the form of diminished creative opportunities for second comers, has likely been 
overstated. See generally Fishman, supra note 123, at 1334-40 (pushing back on the view that the 
constraints created by copyright law have a purely negative effect on “downstream” creators by 
arguing that “[c]opyright scholarship has neglected constraint’s generative upside for the production 
of creative expression downstream”). Even if so, though, we agree that the harm to follow-on creators 
is more than zero. See id. at 1400-03 (acknowledging “aspects of the copyright system [that] diminish 
its constraints’ usefulness” to second comers). 
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uses helps keep these social costs no larger than they need be to facilitate 
production. Whatever private harm owners might experience by the inability to 
control uses they never had in mind at the time of creation, that harm shouldn’t 
affect the initial investment decision. True, it would reduce the unexpected bonus 
they would gain. But as Eric Kades has observed in the taxation context, 
redistributing such windfalls should still leave intact private incentives to invest. 
“[T]axing surprises,” as he puts it, “cannot distort agents’ economic planning.”215 
The lack of harm to upstream owners isn’t a foreseeability limitation’s only 
virtue. It also accrues social benefits downstream. Exempting unforeseeable 
uses sends a signal to downstream innovators to explore and exploit new 
markets that the owner’s industry hasn’t yet envisioned. It steers commercial 
activity toward risk taking, channeling second comers toward new adaptations 
rather than sterilely copying what the public already has.216 
This general logic applies well to trade secrets. Trade secret protection 
induces firms to invest in developing valuable information without engaging 
in as much wasteful self-help to keep that information away from 
competitors.217 To perform that inducement role, the law must offer a carrot 
sufficiently large to convince firms that they’ll be able to recoup their 
expenses. If a company is content with that carrot based on projected revenues 
from x number of foreseeable uses, it would still make the investment even 
without the extra returns from an x+1th use that it had never contemplated. 
Imagine, for instance, if a high-level employee of the Coca-Cola Company 
departed with her (legitimately acquired) knowledge of its secret formula. After 
studying its chemical structure, she discovers that if she combines it with other 
ingredients, she can put it to a novel use: automotive fuel.218 She begins selling 
the fuel through her new firm, prompting an immediate lawsuit. Under our 
proposal, a court would ask whether Coke would stand to lose any current or 
reasonably foreseeable segment of its market. Assuming, as we do, that the 
answer would be no, that employee would face no liability for her use of the 
 
215 See Kades, supra note 213, at 1494-95. 
216 Cf. Fishman, supra note 123, at 1397 (making a similar observation about copyright fair use’s 
privileging of uses deemed to be “transformative”). 
217 See Lemley, supra note 28, 333-37 (reviewing evidence that, without legal protection, 
companies overinvest in keeping valuable information secret and underinvest in precontractual 
negotiations with potential business partners). 
218 Is this a stretch? Maybe, but then again you might not have thought to use McDonald’s 
fries to cure male pattern baldness, either. See Christina Zhao, Chemical in McDonald’s Fries Could 
Cure Baldness, Study Says, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 5, 2018, 10:01 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/
chemical-mcdonalds-fries-may-cure-male-baldness-study-say-799439 [https://perma.cc/R72S-9YUM] 
(discussing a Japanese study that used a chemical added to McDonald’s fries to regrow hair on mice). 
And for what it’s worth, Coke can at least be used therapeutically in a lavage for treating gastric 
phytobezoars. See S.D. Ladas et al., Systematic Review: Coca-Cola Can Effectively Dissolve Gastric Phytobezoars 
as a First-Line Treatment, 37 ALIMENTARY PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 169, 169 (2013). 
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formula. We think this would be a sensible result—and one that probably 
wouldn’t occur under current law. Competing with the plaintiff is, after all, not 
an element of a misappropriation claim.219 The R&D boost that the employee’s 
knowledge gave her at the outset would be enough to support liability. 
This dynamic of individual employees reaching a breakthrough 
unanticipated by their corporate employer has recurred in several famous 
examples from the history of innovation. During World War II, for instance, a 
researcher at Eastman Kodak was experimenting with chemicals called 
cyanoacrylates to make a clear plastic that could be used for precision gunsights. 
But his team scrapped the project after the substances consistently proved too 
sticky.220 In 1951, the same researcher was again experimenting with the 
chemicals, this time for a heat-resistant polymer to cover jet airplane canopies. 
Again, too sticky.221 But this time, he realized these chemicals might have some 
useful application in an entirely different setting: adhesives. In 1958, the product 
finally made it to market under the now-familiar brand name Super Glue.222 
As it happened, the employee had stayed with Kodak throughout the 
process of discovery. But what if his pathbreaking realization had come only 
after he had left the company, armed with the knowledge he had acquired 
there about how cyanoacrylates work? Would Kodak have had a viable claim 
for misappropriation? Under current law, many courts would ask whether the 
employee’s adhesives research had benefitted from his time at Kodak—and 
the answer would surely be yes. But asking that question risks handing the 
employer a windfall if it had made its investments in the employee’s work 
without any expectation that he might develop a high-strength glue. We think 
the better question is whether a reasonable competitor in the industry would 
have foreseen this particular commercial application. Maybe the answer is yes 
(in hindsight, it sounds plain enough that sticky things should be used to stick 
things together). Or, then again, maybe the answer is no (after all, this 
employee was the first to make the connection, and even he took years to do 
so). But however the factual question is resolved, we think the focus should 
be on what a firm in Kodak’s position should have seen coming. 
If you prefer low-strength adhesives over high-strength ones, there’s a 
foreseeability story for that, too. The technology we now know under the brand 
 
219 See Collelo v. Geographic Servs., Inc., 727 S.E.2d 55, 61-62 (Va. 2012) (“[T]he Trade Secrets 
Act does not require that one who is accused of misappropriating a trade secret use the allegedly 
misappropriated trade secret to compete with the holder of the trade secret.”). 
220 See Barnaby F. Feder, All About/Adhesive; Making Things Stick in the Age of Plastic, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/31/business/all-about-adhesives-making-
things-stick-in-the-age-of-plastic.html (providing an overview of the history of superglues). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. On the science behind Super Glue, see Alcohol-Catalyzeda-Cyanoacrylate Adhesive 
Compositions, U.S. Patent No. 2,768,109 (filed June 2, 1954) (issued Oct. 23, 1956). 
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name Post-it Notes began as a failed experiment at 3M to make a strong glue 
for the aerospace industry.223 The company’s decisionmakers considered the 
compound useless.224 Yet several researchers essentially went rogue and 
developed the product anyway because they foresaw a genuine demand for an 
especially weak adhesive rather than an especially strong one. Here again, 
though, what if they had walked after 3M told them no? If they had left the 
company, would they have been committing misappropriation if they continued 
work on adhesive bookmarks? We think the answer should depend on whether 
3M’s apparent lack of foresight would have been shared by its industry peers. 
Similar what-if thought experiments could be performed with the 
employees behind various other famous technologies, from consumer products 
like Play-Doh (initially developed as a nontoxic wallpaper cleaner before 
anyone had an inkling that it might work as a toy)225 to drugs like Viagra 
(originally intended to treat angina pain before some scientists noticed that 
patients were experiencing erections as a side effect).226 Because serendipity 
plays such a large role in innovation, technologists will continue to stumble 
upon new products and uses that they couldn’t reasonably have predicted at the 
outset.227 That unpredictability ought to cabin a trade secret’s scope. 
Such a foreseeability limitation isn’t untested. Once again, the existing 
copyright infringement framework already offers a version of our proposal. 
Tucked into the back end of the analysis, after a plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case of infringement, is a defense that covers instances where the 
user’s conduct posed no commercial harm to the owner. This focus on market 
effects enters the picture through the fair use doctrine, a judge-made standard 
now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107. Fair use is “an equitable rule of reason, which 
permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on 
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to 
foster.”228 One of the statutory factors that courts are instructed to consider 
is the level of harm to the plaintiff ’s markets.229 The Supreme Court has 
 
223 See Pamela Cyran & Chris Gaylord, The 20 Most Fascinating Accidental Inventions: 2. Post-its, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 5, 2012), https://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2012/1005/
The-20-most-fascinating-accidental-inventions/Post-its [https://perma.cc/C96W-R9U8] (describing 
the origin story of Post-it Notes). 
224 Id. 
225 Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1, 42 (2013). 
226 Hossein A. Ghofrani et al., Sildenafil: From Angina to Erectile Dysfunction to Pulmonary 
Hypertension and Beyond, 5 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 689, 689-70 (2006) (detailing the 
discovery of the use of sildenafil, originally an anti-angina drug, as a treatment for erectile dysfunction). 
227 Cf. Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009). 
228 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation 
omitted) (first quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984); and 
then quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
For fair use’s origins in U.S. common law, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (D. Mass. 1841). 
229 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). 
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called it “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”230 and 
“the ‘most important, and indeed, central fair use factor.’”231 
Which licensing markets count is a recurring question in copyright cases. 
Of course, whatever the defendant’s challenged activity happens to be, there 
are always foregone royalties at stake. But it would be perverse if a copyright 
owner’s sheer willingness to license a use would spring forth a right to control 
that use; were it so, every defendant would flunk the market-harm part of the 
test.232 Even if we wished to charge you, dear reader, for simply thinking 
about this Article, we wouldn’t suffer an actionable harm when you do so for 
free.233 Courts have therefore recognized that “not every effect on potential 
licensing revenues enters the analysis under the fourth factor.”234 They must 
somehow distinguish between uses for which a copyright owner is entitled to 
require a license and uses for which it isn’t. 
 
230 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
231 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 238 (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1978)). The Court has since softened that stance. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 n.21 (1994) (“[T]he importance of this [market harm] factor will vary, 
not only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other 
factors.”). Nevertheless, lower courts still emphasize it. See, e.g., Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 
F. 3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (criticizing case law that overemphasizes a use’s transformativeness 
and concluding that market harm usually should be the most important question); see also Authors 
Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that “the Supreme Court has made 
clear that some of the statute’s four listed factors are more significant than others” and quoting its 
reference to market harm as the most important factor); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 
301, 312 (4th Cir. 2010) (similar). Many commentators, too, continue to view it as the test’s linchpin. 
See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 549, 586 (2008) (finding that within published fair use cases under the current Copyright 
Act, “the outcome of the [market harm] factor appears to drive the outcome of the test,” while “the 
outcome of the [nature of the use] factor also appears to be highly influential”); James Gibson, Risk 
Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 896 (2007) (describing 
widespread agreement that the market-harm factor is “the most important”). 
232 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. (In re Texaco Inc.), 60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (“[W]ere a court automatically to conclude in every case that potential licensing revenues 
were impermissibly impaired simply because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to 
engage in the use, the fourth fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that “if 
carried to its logical conclusion,” the plaintiff ’s circular argument over lost licensing revenue “would 
eviscerate the affirmative defense of fair use since every copyright infringer seeking the protection of 
the fair use doctrine could have potentially sought a license from the owner of the infringed work”); 
Fromer & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1293 (“If IP owners are free to argue that the entire world is their 
market because they could demand a license fee in exchange for not suing someone who uses their 
work in a particular way, the market substitution test becomes circular and ultimately empty.”). 
233 Still, tips are always appreciated. 
234 Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 929. 
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Many cases have accomplished that task by invoking a foreseeability 
standard—much like the one we envision.235 In these cases, the fourth factor’s 
investigation of potential licensing revenues is limited to “traditional, 
reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.”236 Remote, transformative 
ventures, by contrast, have a stronger claim to remaining open for second comers 
to try. Thus, for example, an artist who plastered posters on walls as street art 
couldn’t control a band’s use of that art within a video backdrop for a concert 
performance.237 Or a company that recorded a conference call with investment 
analysts couldn’t control Bloomberg’s dissemination of the recording to its 
subscribers because, at the time of recording, it was unaware of whether such a 
licensing market existed, and the possibility of tapping into one “played no role 
in stimulating” its creation.238 By contrast, a television series’ producer could 
control the exploitation of a book of episode plot summaries where licensed book 
versions were already an established part of the market.239 And a quilt’s designer 
could control appearances of the quilt in a sitcom where she was already 
commonly licensing similar artwork for use in film and television.240 The upshot 
is that the less predictable the defendant’s commercial usage of the plaintiff ’s 
work, the less right the plaintiff has to demand permission. 
To be sure, these cases have provided almost no details on how their 
foreseeability concept is supposed to work. Courts haven’t discussed whose 
foresight matters, which point in time that foresight should be measured 
from, or how factfinding on these questions should be structured. Copyright 
cases holding in both the plaintiff ’s241 favor and the defendant’s242 alike tend 
 
235 See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work Right, 
101 GEO. L.J. 1505, 1521, 1559-60 (2013) (pointing out policy reasons to limit derivative-work rights 
to clearly foreseeable markets). 
236 Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930; accord, e.g., TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 
F.3d 168, 186 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930); Seltzer v. Green Day, 
Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ringgold v. Black Entnm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 
70, 81 (2d Cir. 1997)); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 
2006) (quoting Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81. 
237 Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1179. 
238 Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 91 (2d Cir. 2014). 
239 See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting a fair 
use defense because the books “report[ed] the plot in such extraordinary detail as to risk impairment of the 
market for the copyrighted works themselves or derivative works that the author is entitled to license”). 
240 See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81-82 (denying the defendant’s summary judgment motion). 
241 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145-46 (2d Cir. 
1998) (holding that a trivia book containing questions about the characters and plotlines of Seinfeld 
infringed on the sitcom’s copyright, without reciting any facts as to whether at that time trivia books 
based on fictional content customarily required a license, based on the court’s assertion that the 
defendant was “likely to fill a market niche that [the plaintiff] would in general develop”). 
242 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 
2006) (holding that reproducing a band’s concert posters and photographs in a historical anthology 
was not a “traditional” licensing market that the plaintiff was entitled to control, even though the 
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to proclaim the standard loudly without explaining precisely why it cashes 
out a particular way when applied to the relevant facts. This cursoriness has 
prompted some copyright scholars to offer their own visions of how this 
doctrinal intuition could be made more analytically rigorous.243 
Still, even if this bit of copyright doctrine is underspecified, the courts 
that invoke it are at least onto something fundamental. Just as negligence 
doctrine has no economic need to make a defendant internalize the costs of 
an unanticipatable loss, copyright doctrine has no economic need to allow a 
plaintiff to internalize the benefits of an unanticipatable gain. It lets owners 
control exploitation of their works both in their primary markets and in 
ancillary markets that are “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed.”244 When applied properly, that standard serves as a gatekeeper 
that withholds exclusivity in markets that weren’t objectively foreseeable at 
the time the author decided to invest in making the work.245 
In the remainder of this Section, we try to fill in some of the practical 
details for how a foreseeability limitation should work in trade secret cases. 
First though, we pause to consider two potential objections to the entire 
enterprise. One possible argument against a foreseeability limitation concerns 
entrepreneurs who expect the unexpected. Maybe, the theory would go, some 
innovators are incentivized not only by the revenue streams that they foresee 
but also by the expectation that they will be able to capture even those that 
they can’t foresee—untethered to any particular industry trend or forecast.246 
If such indiscriminate optimism for the future does provide an incentive, 
however, it’s likely to be weak. Innovation is already beset by all sorts of 
technological and financial uncertainties.247 Most paths in scientific research 
 
defendant had paid fees to other copyright owners for their images and the plaintiff had “established 
a market for licensing its images”). 
243 See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 211, at 1571 (proposing a test “to limit copyright’s grant of exclusivity 
to situations where a copier’s use was reasonably foreseeable at the time of creation”); Christina Bohannan, 
Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 973-74, 1028 (2007) (describing how 
courts infer harm from foreseeable uses and require proof of harm for less foreseeable uses). 
244 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Texaco Inc.), 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
245 See Bohannan, supra note 243, at 1019 (“Clearly, these courts are attempting to limit liability 
to foreseeable markets, which are the markets most likely to influence an author’s decision to create 
a copyrighted work.”); Justin Hughes, Response, Copyright and Its Rewards, Foreseen and Unforeseen, 
122 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 81, 89-90 (2009) (comparing this test to a foreseeability inquiry); 
Samuelson, supra note 235, at 1559 (concluding that the dominant rationales for granting copyright 
owners control over derivative works apply only to foreseeable markets). 
246 The Supreme Court accepted a version of this argument when it upheld Congress’s 
retroactive extension of copyright’s duration for already existing works, reasoning that authors could 
have been incentivized both by the existing term length and by a prediction that Congress would 
extend it at some indeterminate future point. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215 (2003). 
247 See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking 
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 101-03 (1994) (describing the contingencies a new invention might face). 
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turn out to be dead ends, and the few promising ones that emerge often face 
obstacles to successful commercialization. Given the gauntlet of 
contingencies, the ability to control entirely unforeseeable future markets 
amounts to a lottery ticket whose award is simply another lottery ticket. The 
marginal incentive effect is probably minimal.248 
That’s not to say that for-profit firms don’t ever engage in basic, exploratory 
science—though in recent years it’s become rarer.249 Even when they do, 
however, they tend to be motivated by more than just an expectation that their 
early discoveries will remain entirely proprietary. On the contrary, corporate 
scientists working on basic research have often published their results for the 
world to see.250 There may be good financial reasons to do so. Secret or not, 
such in-house research can give a firm a leg up in developing its own 
commercial products downstream.251 It can also help with what economists 
Wesley Cohen and Daniel Levinthal dubbed “absorptive capacity”—the firm’s 
ability to understand and exploit technological developments from the external 
environment.252 To the extent that secrecy isn’t already driving the marginal 
dollar of private-sector investment in basic science, limiting trade secrecy scope 
to foreseeable markets wouldn’t significantly alter the playing field. 
 
248 See Balganesh, supra note 211, at 1619-20 (noting that the “inherently probabilistic nature of the 
rights bundle . . . generates sufficient uncertainty on its own”); Merges, supra note 247, at 101-03 (asserting 
that harm to incentives is minimal because so many contingencies must occur before the reverse doctrine 
of equivalents applies). As Michael Meurer and Craig Nard note in the doctrine-of-equivalents context, 
while an inventor could in theory be incentivized by some “aggregate probability” of many improbable 
technological developments, “[t]here is no statistical evidence suggesting this is a serious problem,” and 
“case law and the history of technology” suggest that “few inventors have much to fear.” Meurer & Nard, 
supra note 101, at 1998 (2005). 
249 See Ashish Arora et al., The Decline of Science in Corporate R&D, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 
3, 3 (2018) (finding that corporate “labs increasingly focus on developing existing knowledge and 
commercializing it, rather than creating new knowledge”). 
250 See, e.g., Ashish Arora et al., Back to Basics: Why Do Firms Invest in Research? 5 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23,187, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23187 [https://perma.cc/
4EUG-ZZKV]. Of course, there are exceptions, though we think they tend to prove the rule. A notable 
one as of this writing is Google’s top-secret “Calico” project, a biotech venture focused on understanding 
and reversing aging. See Julia Belluz, Google Is Super Secretive About Its Anti-Aging Research. No One Knows 
Why, VOX (Apr. 28, 2017, 2:35 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/4/27/15409672/
google-calico-secretive-aging-mortality-research [https://perma.cc/WE4S-TRM2]; Antonio Regalado, 
Google’s Long, Strange, Life-Span Trip, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/
s/603087/googles-long-strange-life-span-trip [https://perma.cc/88N3-5M37] (“Calico has remained a 
riddle, a super-secretive company that three years in hasn’t published anything of note, rebuffs journalists, 
and asks visiting scientists to sign nondisclosure agreements.”). 
251 See Arora et al., supra note 250, at 2 (collecting data linking patents to scientific publications 
matched to firms and concluding that “while spillovers might cause firms to underinvest in research, 
firms would still invest in research if they are able to use it internally”). 
252 See Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 128, 128 (1990); Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. 
Levinthal, Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D, 99 ECON. J. 569, 569 (1989). 
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A second argument against this legal intervention concerns the viability of 
licensing markets. If the defendant has indeed appropriated something 
material, why not simply ask that she take out a license to produce her modified 
product? Why, in other words, wouldn’t the originator and adapter reach a 
Coasean bargain regardless of who receives the initial entitlement? Perhaps, the 
argument might go, it would be simpler to assign the originating firm the rights 
over a wide range of markets—even ones that a court might ultimately deem 
unforeseeable at the outset—rather than divvying those rights up through a 
messy, fact-intensive investigation.253 An efficient licensing market would 
ensure that second comers could pursue innovative ways to exploit the secret, 
even if they have to pay a portion of their returns to do so. 
A standard rebuttal to such arguments in the IP literature is to emphasize 
the costliness of transacting over rights in intangible information.254 We agree 
that impediments to efficient licensing are often present, but we think they 
are particularly strong in the world of trade secrets. In patent law, at least, an 
improver of an underlying, patented technology is entitled to a separate 
patent on the improvement. Because practicing the improvement patent 
usually means infringing the claims of the original, the improver must first 
get a license from the original patentee. The original patentee, meanwhile, 
cannot practice the improvement without the improver’s permission. This 
“blocking patents” scenario encourages the parties to enter a cross-licensing 
agreement, each armed with valuable consideration to offer the other.255 
 
253 Such an argument would echo Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory of patents, which posited 
that it is socially beneficial to issue broad patent rights in the early stages of technical development, 
not so much to encourage invention upstream but to encourage efficient use and commercialization 
downstream. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 276 (1977). The theory has proven controversial. Compare Lemley, supra note 3, at 1045-46 
(arguing that the theory requires assuming “that information is perfect, all parties are rational, and 
licensing is costless”), with John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
439, 443-44 (2004) (arguing that the patent system’s prospect features are important because they 
channel rivalry in ways that maximize the social benefits from the patent monopoly). 
254 See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual 
Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1393 (2009) (“Most commentators agree that difficulties in valuing 
patents and copyrights raise transaction costs to the point that allocative efficiency will depend upon the 
subject matter, scope and duration of intellectual property entitlements.”); Frischmann & Lemley, supra 
note 153, at 275-78 (“Search, identification, and transaction costs are much greater with IP than they are 
with land or goods. . . . Once we admit that we live in a world rife with transaction costs, we must also 
admit that both design and allocation of rights matter. This is especially true of IP.” (footnote omitted)); 
Lemley, supra note 3, at 1053-56 (observing that “while the parties ideally would base the cost of a license 
on the value of the right licensed, that value will likely be difficult to determine accurately in the case of 
unique goods like intellectual property rights” and the “difficulty of valuing both original inventions and 
improvements, may also prevent bargaining parties from coming to terms”). 
255 See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1052 (“[B]locking patents provides just such a bargaining 
mechanism. Improvers have an incentive to invest in research even in the shadow of an original 
invention, since they can obtain a patent on their improvement. And the fact that an improvement 
patent gives them some real bargaining power also provides them with an incentive to come to the 
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Trade secrecy, by contrast, offers downstream adapters no real bargaining 
chip to bring to the negotiating table. Even if they could assert their own 
trade secret protection over their modifications, it would likely mean little to 
the originator, who might just as well be able to develop the same information 
in house.256 Realistically, they would have only the value of the modifications 
themselves, but of course they can’t disclose a modification without handing 
it to the trade secret owner unencumbered. And the original trade secret 
owner can’t value the modification without knowing what it is. This 
predicament, Kenneth Arrow’s famous information paradox, can prevent the 
two sides from even understanding what they would be bargaining over—let 
alone what the right bargain would be.257 
Even if this paradox could be overcome, the typical trade secret licensing 
scenario is rife with noneconomic reasons for bargaining breakdown. It’s hard 
enough trying to make a deal with your own competitors.258 Now imagine if 
that competitor has hired away one of your star employees, who is working 
very hard to enrich them, quite possibly at your expense. The success or failure 
of licensing negotiations in the world of mobile talent can be driven by feelings 
of betrayal or anger just as much as it can be by dollars and cents.259 To take a 
notorious example, the plaintiff in one of modern trade secret law’s most 
famous cases, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,260 was driven not by concerns over 
misappropriation but by indignation that a rival could raid its employees—and 
that its employees might prefer a competitor.261 However great the likelihood 
 
bargaining table, and indirectly, an incentive to invest in improvement in the first place.”); cf. 
Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265, 298 (2011) (theorizing that 
an expectation of blocking patents bringing upstream and downstream innovators to the bargaining 
table has led to doctrinal obsolescence of the reverse doctrine of equivalents, which exempts 
substantial improvers from infringement liability altogether). 
256 A blocking patent, by contrast, gives the downstream inventor a good bargaining position precisely 
because it would foreclose any later development, even if done independently. No trade secret can do that. 
257 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 
(1962). To some extent, all licensing negotiations over trade secrets suffer from this problem. See 
POOLEY, supra note 4, at § 6.05 (noting that a potential licensee may be reluctant to expose 
employees who are best equipped to assess the licensor’s technology for fear that “[e]xposing them 
to the secrets of the prospective licensor might taint them and engender subsequent litigation if the 
technology ultimately is developed in-house”). For more on how Arrow’s information paradox can 
play out in IP licensing generally, see Lemley, supra note 3, at 1051. 
258 See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1061 (“Corporate intellectual property owners may refuse to 
license patent rights to a competitor not because there is anything wrong with the licensing deal, 
but simply because the proposed licensee is a competitor.”). 
259 Cf., e.g., Proline Prods., L.L.C. v. McBride, 324 P.3d 430, 432-33 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014) 
(describing estrangements and reconciliations in management of secret formula within a family 
business, ultimately ending in misappropriation). 
260 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
261 See Alan Hyde, The Story of PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond: How the Doctrine of Inevitable 
Disclosure of the Trade Secrets of Marketing Sports Beverages Was Brewed, in EMPLOYMENT LAW 
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of bargaining breakdown in other areas of IP, noneconomic factors in common 
trade secrecy scenarios can make things worse. 
Thus far, this Section has presented the general case for cabining trade secrecy’s 
substantial derivation standard to reasonably foreseeable markets. In the two 
subsections below, we address two subsidiary, doctrinal-design questions that this 
standard would raise: (1) whose foreseeing counts and (2) as of which moment in 
time? As we explain, the best version of this test would be based on what the 
plaintiff could have foreseen or should have foreseen based on trends and 
developments within its industry, as of the date the trade secret was first developed. 
1. Whose Foresight? 
Once trade secrecy can settle on the right questions to ask, it must decide 
who should be answering them. Jeanne Fromer and Mark Lemley refer to this 
decision as IP infringement’s choice of “audience”: from whose perspective 
should factfinders conduct a similarity assessment—an average layperson, a 
technical expert, a consumer from the intended demographic, or perhaps 
someone else entirely?262 For trade secrets, a commercial foreseeability test 
should be measured from the perspective of reasonable competitors within the 
plaintiff ’s industry. That is, courts would ask whether the plaintiff actually 
knew, or should have known based on industry trends, that its secret was likely 
to be exploited in the manner that the defendant had chosen. 
On the standard account, IP rights are meant to insulate creative investment 
from potential market harms. And to figure out what’s going to happen in the 
marketplace, factfinders must channel the views of the consumers who comprise 
it. It thus makes sense to think about IP scope from a commercial perspective.263 
In cases where the secret is embodied in a retail product, that perspective is 
essentially the end consumer’s. The protected information is baked directly into 
the goods for which consumers are paying, much in the same way as a patented 
 
STORIES 117, 125 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007) (offering the account of PepsiCo’s 
lawyer that, “for PepsiCo, protecting information was ‘not the top priority,’” and “PepsiCo was 
actually upset about Uzzi’s raiding their employees”). 
262 See generally Fromer & Lemley, supra note 2. The authors do not mention trade secrecy except 
in a footnote that suggests that courts in these cases seem to be employing a “reasonable competitor” 
standard. Id. at 1254 n.7. As we discuss in this Section, we certainly agree that putting oneself in a 
competitor’s shoes is a worthy goal in trade secrecy cases. But as a description of current judicial practice, 
we fear that the authors may be giving courts too much credit. In our survey of trade secret cases, we found 
almost no suggestion that judges had a particular vantage point in mind for making similarity assessments. 
263 See id. at 1290-91. Fromer and Lemley also argue that infringement liability should require a 
similarity finding from the perspective of technical experts, not just of consumers. Id. at 1286-90. In 
their framework, however, those experts enter the analysis through improvement doctrines (like 
transformative use in copyright or the reverse doctrine of equivalents in patent) in order to ensure that 
an IP entitlement’s scope doesn’t sweep in others’ radical advances. The role of such improvements in 
trade secrecy doctrine has been discussed elsewhere and lies beyond our scope here. See supra note 21. 
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toaster or a copyrighted romance novel. But trade secrets, likely more so than any 
other form of IP, often aren’t directed at end consumers. Instead, they frequently 
derive their commercial value from internal use within the firm. A proprietary 
manufacturing method might help get goods to market more cheaply, but the end 
user isn’t interested in the method. Likewise, a customer list might enable enough 
sales to justify the years of business negotiations and relationship building that 
underlie it, but none of those customers is purchasing the list. 
For this reason, when it comes to market harm in trade secrecy cases, we think 
that a consumer lens will frequently end up being beside the point. For trade 
secrets that are exploited purely internally, the hypothetical market demand that 
matters comes not from the firm’s customers but from its competitors. When 
such a trade secret is at issue, courts will need to ask whether the competitor’s 
method of exploitation is a good substitute for the owner’s method. 
Of course, a particular plaintiff might have more specialized knowledge 
that gives it better foresight than do its industry peers. In such cases, the 
plaintiff should not be penalized just because the rest of the field hasn’t yet 
caught up. Our proposal of tying foreseeability to the reasonable consumer 
or competitor is meant to be a floor. If the plaintiff knows more and can 
therefore forecast a wider range of potential markets, it should get the benefit 
of a correspondingly larger scope. In this sense, our proposal is the mirror 
image of the black letter negligence rule that “[i]f an actor has skills or 
knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or 
knowledge are circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether 
the actor has behaved as a reasonably careful person.”264 Just as superior 
foresight expands the boundaries of a defendant’s duty in a negligence case, 
so too should they expand the boundaries of a plaintiff ’s entitlement scope in 
an infringement case. A plaintiff should receive that expanded scope if it can 
produce contemporaneous evidence showing its efforts to enter into a market 
that would otherwise seem remote. Originating firms would thus avoid being 
penalized for staying ahead of the curve. Indeed, this standard may 
incentivize them to get even further ahead than they otherwise would.265 
 
264 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 12 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010); see, e.g., Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 653, 659 (Mass. 1978) (holding a 
hockey coach to a higher standard of care because he had acquired substantial experience and knowledge); 
Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372-73 (N.Y. 1968) (“[A] physician should use his 
best judgment and whatever superior knowledge, skill and intelligence he has. Thus, a specialist may be 
held liable where a general practitioner may not.” (citation omitted)); Osborne v. Montgomery, 234 N.W. 
372, 380 (Wis. 1931) (“If the actor in a particular case in fact has superior perception or possesses superior 
knowledge, he is required to exercise his superior powers in determining whether or not his conduct 
involves an unreasonable risk of injury to the interests of another . . . .”). 
265 One possible objection is that firms might be perversely incentivized to invest in developing 
new knowledge only to warehouse it—not to use it—just for the sake of expanding their rights’ scope. 
We suspect, however, that any such incentive wouldn’t change actual research trajectories except at 
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2. Foreseeability as of When? 
Introducing foreseeability to the misappropriation analysis requires a 
choice of timing. Should the range of reasonably anticipatable markets be 
assessed from the time when the plaintiff first developed the secret 
information, or instead from when the alleged misappropriation first occurred? 
We think the earlier point in time makes better sense. If trade secret 
protection is meant to encourage the development of socially valuable 
information, its foreseeability analysis should be tied to the point in time 
when an owner decides to invest in that development.266 That moment—the 
decision whether to pursue a project or not, to spend more or less on it, or to 
prioritize it now or later—is when the law’s incentive effects actually matter. 
Of course, R&D isn’t an owner’s only expense over the life of a trade 
secret. Even after the information has come into existence, owners must make 
continual investments in guarding its secrecy. If they don’t, the legal 
protection ceases to exist. But trade secret law doesn’t seek to promote these 
continued secrecy investments for their own sake. It requires them, rather, as 
a signaling device that the secrets at issue are valuable enough to merit legal 
protection.267 Indeed, most commentators would think society better off if 
information were shared freely. As a result, while trade secrecy is rightfully 
concerned with subsidizing R&D in the first instance, it shouldn’t be 
concerned with separately subsidizing these secrecy investments downstream. 
So long as would-be owners see enough value in trade secrecy protection over 
the markets that are reasonably anticipatable at the point of development, 
 
the extreme margin. Firms likely have so many demands on their R&D resources that they wouldn’t 
invest in projects whose only forecasted benefit is expanding an existing trade secret’s scope in entirely 
unknown directions. In any event, if our suspicion turns out to be wrong, policymakers could consider 
requiring some affirmative use of the secret in order to achieve protection. That addition, however, 
would require diverging from the UTSA, which grants protection to used and unused information 
alike. See Eric R. Claeys, The Use Requirement at Common Law and Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
33 HAMLINE L. REV. 583, 584 (2010); Varadarajan, supra note 41, at 392-93. 
266 Cf. Balganesh, supra note 211, at 1588-89, 1603 (arguing in favor of a foreseeability filter in 
copyright that “would require a plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s copying was objectively 
foreseeable at the time of creation” because postcreation considerations “bear little connection to the idea 
of creator incentives” (emphasis omitted)). On this temporal point, we part ways from the copyright 
model, which generally assesses a market’s foreseeability as of the time of infringement. See id. at 1589 
(“Courts have . . . based the determination on plaintiffs’ post-creation ability, motive, interest, or 
expectation to enter a certain market—but never on their ex ante incentive in creating the work . . . .”). 
267 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(observing that trade secrecy requires owners to take reasonable precautions because, if an owner 
had “expended only paltry resources on preventing” a secret “from falling into the hands of 
competitors . . . why should the law, whose machinery is far from costless, bother to provide [it] 
with a remedy,” as the “information . . . cannot have been worth much if [the owner] did not think 
it worthwhile to make serious efforts to keep the information secret”); see also Varadarajan, supra 
note  41 (describing various rationales for this requirement). 
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they will make the investments that the law cares about. Whether they choose 
later on to continue investing in secrecy is secondary. 
Identifying that point in time will probably be easier for some kinds of 
secrets than for others. For technological information, patent law provides a 
doctrinal template. Much like the assessment of a patentee’s date of 
invention, the date of a trade secret’s creation would correspond to the date 
when a device or process incorporating the secret was successfully reduced to 
working form.268 For business information like customer lists, the answer is 
less clear. Such information may be constantly evolving, leaving a single date 
of creation harder to deduce. Ultimately, however, we aren’t nearly as 
concerned about business-information cases because we suspect that a 
colorable foreseeability argument is less likely to come up. Business 
information is often firm or industry specific. Courts are probably less likely 
to encounter situations where a departing employee makes use of it in a 
remote market. To go back to the hypothetical employee at Coca-Cola: even 
if the company’s secret formula finds a surprising demand in the world of 
automotive fuels, we doubt that its customer lists would as well. 
One drawback to reaching further back in time to peg the foreseeability 
analysis is hindsight bias. Where foreseeability of the defendant’s use is 
assessed in the present based on some state of affairs in the distant past, 
hindsight bias may push toward an anachronistic conclusion that the 
defendant’s use was more foreseeable than it actually was.269 We concede that, 
to some degree, this bias is likely unavoidable. Still, as courts develop a body 
of case law applying a foreseeability filter in trade secrecy, they may come to 
rely on various considerations to help mitigate hindsight bias’s effects, much 
the same way as patent jurisprudence has done in assessing nonobviousness.270 
 
268 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006), repealed by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 
sec. 3, § 102, 125 Stat. 284, 285-87 (2011) (providing, before the 2011 enactment of the America Invents Act, 
that priority is generally granted to the first inventor who reduced the invention to practice). Reducing 
an invention to practice means building a working version of it or filing a patent application with enough 
disclosure to enable others in the field to build a working version of it. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra 
note 101, at 451 (explaining that § 102(g)’s priority rules were applied to define the “date of invention” in 
other subsections of the 1952 Patent Act). Since the America Invents Act shifted U.S. patent law to a 
first-to-file priority system, the date of invention has become less relevant to recently issued patents. See 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1463 (2016). 
269 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998). 
270 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (explaining that “[s]uch 
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of 
others, . . . might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject 
matter sought to be patented” and that “[a]s indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries 
may have relevancy”); In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 
676 F.3d 1063, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasizing the importance of these secondary considerations 
in “guard[ing] as a check against hindsight bias”). For more exploration of the hindsight problem in 
patent law’s nonobviousness context, see generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not 
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III. POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATIONS 
So what now? Courts have gotten trade secrecy into its current muddle on 
adaptive uses. Courts can just as well get it out. Across multiple intellectual 
property regimes, judges have been the driving force behind crafting and refining 
infringement standards.271 Try to find the substantial similarity standard in the 
Copyright Act or the doctrine of equivalents in the Patent Act.272 You’ll find them 
only in judicial opinions.273 Even provisions within these statutes that modern 
practitioners may take for granted as legislative, from copyright’s idea–expression 
dichotomy274 and fair use defense275 to patent law’s nonobviousness requirement,276 
began in the courts, only to be codified later once Congress had caught up.277 
Likely nowhere within IP is this judicial role more profound than in trade 
secrecy. Unlike copyrights and patents, which received at least terse legislative 
protection beginning with the very first Congress, trade secrets have lived 
most of their existence without even a primordial statute to cling to. Trade 
secrecy is a creation of the common law.278 
Today, of course, we have both state and federal trade secret statutes. Yet 
while they establish that misappropriation can occur through “use,” they leave 
the term largely undefined.279 As a matter of textual plain meaning, it’s not 
as if that word self-evidently must include mental reliance on information to 
adapt it into something else. (If it did, designing around a patent claim would 
be infringing under the Patent Act,280 a result that would be dead wrong as a 
matter of patent law.) Judges must supply the normative content. Indeed, 
they’ve already established infringement scope in precisely this way for the 
wrongful acquisition form of liability, defining what makes different forms of 
 
So Obvious After All: Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement: KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 
GA. L. REV. 41 (2012), and Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That 
the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006). 
271 Peter S. Menell, The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and Ramifications for 
Statutory Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 63, 63 
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (discussing the standards for patent and copyright infringement 
and concluding that “the judiciary’s imprint and evolving role are unmistakable and profound”). 
272 Go on. We’ll wait. 
273 For an excellent survey of courts’ role in fashioning these two statutory torts, see generally 
Menell, supra note 271. 
274 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
275 Id. § 107. 
276 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
277 See Menell, supra note 271, at 63-64 (noting that “several essential statutory provisions—such 
as patent law’s nonobviousness requirement and copyright law’s fair use defense—were created by the 
courts and later codified in ways that perpetuate judicial crafting of these doctrines”). 
278 See supra text accompanying notes 35–36(describing the common law origins of trade secret 
doctrine). 
279 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
280 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority . . . uses . . . any patented invention, 
within the United States . . . during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
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copying proper or improper.281 They can do so just as easily for forms of 
adaptive use. The breadth with which courts have thus far defined “use” 
would be understandable if on balance there were good policy reasons to do 
so. Our argument here is that there aren’t. 
But even if a court agrees with the basic principle that adaptations should 
be treated differently than duplications, they would still have several options 
for how to operationalize it in actual doctrine. Our primary proposal has been 
to target the underlying definition of liability, embedding a more robust 
substantial derivation test within the elements of a plaintiff ’s claim. Courts 
could conceivably take a different tack, however. They could recognize an 
affirmative defense for adapters or even allow liability while excluding an 
adaptation’s downstream value from the remedies calculation. In this final 
Part, we examine the pros and cons of each approach. 
A. Prima Facie Case 
The main benefit of implementing our proposal within a plaintiff ’s prima 
facie case is to give losing claims a relatively quick offramp. The further into 
litigation a potential defendant must go before being able to argue materiality 
and foreseeability, the less any doctrinal intervention is likely to encourage 
that potential defendant to continue working with another’s trade secret. 
Structuring our proposal within the elements of the tort would allow many 
claims to be dismissed on summary judgment. What’s more, given the 
openendedness of the term “use” in the definition of misappropriation, it’s a 
textually straightforward move to make. On the other side of the ledger, 
however, are error costs. Liability is a binary; one either committed 
misappropriation or not. If the decisionmaker gets the answer wrong (that is, 
fails to rule in favor of the party whose victory would best promote social 
welfare), there’s no way to modulate the severity of the error. It’s all or nothing. 
Those error costs are particularly salient because getting the answer right on 
a claim of misappropriation through use will often require a court to get another 
answer right on an accompanying claim of misappropriation through acquisition 
or disclosure. And that answer isn’t always going to be straightforward. 
To reach the right outcome, courts would need to follow two principles. 
The first is that adaptation shouldn’t absolve a defendant of liability for other 
harmful acts. Unauthorized disclosures or acquisitions are generally 
counterproductive whether or not they accompany adaptation that happens to 
be productive. Even groundbreaking adapters should thus still be accountable 
 
281 For example, the reverse-engineering exception, one of the most important limitations on trade 
secret liability, was a creation of the courts. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 
(1974) (“[T]rade secret law, however, does not offer protection against . . . so-called reverse engineering . . . .” 
(citing Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 13 Ohio Cir. Dec. 468, 471 (1902), aff ’d 70 N.E. 1127 (1903))). 
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if after the fact they disclose the secret in ways likely to destroy its value or if 
before the fact they use improper means to acquire it. As to disclosure, a 
fundamental premise of our argument for permitting unforeseeable 
derivatives is that they threaten little legitimate market harm to the trade 
secret owner.282 But if the use winds up spilling the secret, it wipes out the 
entire value. Even if controlling unanticipated derivatives does not enter a 
firm’s ex ante investment calculus, controlling against exclusivity-destroying 
disclosures surely does. Courts should therefore hold downstream adapters 
liable for any public disclosures—just as they do already—independently of 
any defenses those adapters may have against a use-based claim of 
misappropriation. Of course, the risk of ruinous disclosure may make owners 
worry about allowing the secret to escape their custody to begin with. But 
adapters that plan to commercialize their discoveries have a symmetric interest 
in maintaining secrecy. Indeed, this assumption that originator and 
appropriator alike wouldn’t want to see a secret get out is why trade secrecy 
tolerates reverse engineering.283 It should tolerate adaptive use for the same 
reason, while penalizing any disclosures that do occur. 
And as to wrongful acquisition, the requirement serves an independently 
productive purpose of channeling downstream actors toward commercial 
methods with large positive externalities.284 The definition of misappropriation 
privileges reverse engineering over industrial espionage because, as the Seventh 
Circuit has noted, it “involves the use of technical skills that we want to 
encourage.”285 Reverse engineers learn by doing, and that learning can 
eventually spill over into future innovations. By distinguishing between proper 
and improper means of acquisition, trade secrecy effectively subsidizes that 
learning. A competitor who might otherwise be indifferent between costly 
reverse engineering and equally costly snooping is pushed toward the more 
 
282 See generally supra Section II.C. 
283 See Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“[M]isappropriator[s] will often have the same incentive as the originator to maintain the confidentiality 
of the secret in order to profit from the proprietary knowledge.”); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne 
Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1658 (2002) (noting that trade 
secret cases seldom need to address a reverse engineer’s attempt to publish the secret “because reverse 
engineers have generally had little incentive to publish or otherwise disclose information they learn from 
reverse engineering” and “have typically kept the resulting know-how secret for competitive advantage”). 
284 The notion that an otherwise lawful use of information could be tainted by the manner in 
which it was initially obtained is already a familiar principle of copyright’s fair use doctrine. See 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (rejecting a fair use 
defense where the defendant had “knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript”); Atari Games 
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (concluding that “[t]o invoke the 
fair use exception, an individual must possess an authorized copy of a literary work,” and therefore 
rejecting a fair use defense to intermediate copying of source code where the defendant was not 
authorized to possess the code being copied). 
285 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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socially productive option.286 Courts should therefore continue to discriminate 
between legitimate and illegitimate acquisition, irrespective of whether the 
acquisition yields a slavish imitation or a radically different result. 
The second principle is an important exception to the first: adapters should 
be entitled to greater leeway to make a limited disclosure to their coworkers, and 
their coworkers should similarly have wider leeway to acquire the information 
from them. This exception is necessary because adapters are often working as 
part of a team. If a former employee builds on her legitimately acquired 
knowledge of a trade secret to develop a product that’s immaterially similar or 
commercially unforeseeable, our theory would at least require a finding of no 
misappropriation through use. But what if that same employee is pursuing that 
development within a new firm? Is the employee liable for disclosing it to others 
within the firm, even under conditions of strict secrecy? And are those others 
liable for acquiring the trade secret without the owner’s authorization? 
We think not. Normally the black letter answer could be yes. An employee 
can be liable for privately disclosing another’s secret within the firm, and the 
firm could likewise be liable for the acquisition.287 Yet to enforce that rule 
against adaptations that don’t qualify as actionable uses would nullify the 
entire substantial derivation framework.288 So courts would need to show 
 
286 See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 174 (1999) (“[W]hen 
competitors do opt for independent development or reverse engineering, these alternatives channel 
their investment into socially useful activity—either option develops productive technological or 
business expertise within the firm, rather than wasteful expertise in industrial espionage.”); Jeanne 
C. Fromer, A Legal Tangle of Secrets and Disclosures in Trade: Tabor v. Hoffman and Beyond, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 271, 286 
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014) (“[R]equiring third parties to reverse 
engineer—rather than use the secret directly—might also be helpful to the third parties (and society 
at large) by teaching them more about the information, its uses, and further refinements.”). 
287 See Blue Star Land Servs., LLC v. Coleman, No. 17-0931, 2017 WL 6210901, at *6-7 (W.D. Okla. 
Dec. 8, 2017) (concluding that under the DTSA, departing employees who formed a competing firm 
could be held liable on an acquisition-based theory); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (establishing that “[a]n actor may . . . be subject to 
liability . . . in connection with either a public or private disclosure of a trade secret” because “[a] private 
disclosure can increase the likelihood of both unauthorized use and further disclosure”). In many cases, 
a plaintiff will allege misappropriation based on both unauthorized disclosure and use. See, e.g., Penalty 
Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1292-94 (11th Cir. 2003). Cases where a plaintiff alleges 
only disclosure, but not use, tend to involve a defendant who publicly disclosed or threatens to publicly 
disclose the trade secret. See, e.g., Precision Plating & Metal Finishing Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 
435 F.2d 1262, 1263 (5th Cir. 1970) (awarding damages where defendants’ “public disclosure of the [secret] 
process . . . amount[ed] to a complete destruction of the value of the process”). 
288 In a similar vein, firms regularly include provisions in employment agreements to restrain 
departing employees’ use of information, even when the use is immaterial or unforeseeable. Courts 
should view such expansive contract provisions skeptically. Contract nonenforcement doctrines like 
the public policy exception could play a role, just as they have in cases over unreasonably broad 
noncompete agreements. See, e.g., Allied Fire Prot., Inc. v. Thai, No. 17-0551, 2017 WL 4354802, at 
*6-8 (D. Md. Oct. 2, 2017); Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 155-60 (Nev. 2016). 
Some cases have also held unenforceable employment contract provisions that prohibit departing 
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special solicitude for private communications within the adapting firm that 
enable the adaptation to occur. An intrafirm-disclosure claim against the 
adapter, or an improper-acquisition claim against the adapter’s firm, should 
generally rise or fall with the use claim underlying the adaptation itself. 
B. Remedies 
That’s a delicate dance to ask courts to perform. One might therefore 
prefer to leave the definition of “use” alone for liability purposes and instead 
turn to remedies as a policy lever. Allowing courts to reduce the penalty 
would lower the social cost of imposing liability on a defendant who is 
engaged in productive activity. A judge could, for example, hold a defendant 
liable for any use of a trade secret but refuse to award damages unless the 
plaintiff could prove foreseeable harms caused by the defendant’s use. 
As a practical matter, working materiality and foreseeability considerations 
into trade secret remedies would be a mixed bag. When only damages are at issue, 
there shouldn’t be much difficulty. Trade secret damages, including both 
compensatory awards and disgorgement of a defendant’s profits, already take 
proximate causation into account.289 The doctrinal infrastructure is already set up. 
It may be harder, however, to incorporate those same factors into the 
analysis of injunctive relief. An injunction is what misappropriation plaintiffs 
most commonly want,290 and courts are likely to grant one, even if they’re also 
awarding damages.291 Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.,292 which reduced the availability of injunctions as a 
 
employees from using publicly available information in their new endeavors. See Dynamics Research 
Corp. v. Analytic Scis. Corp., 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1288 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (“[A] non-disclosure 
agreement which seeks to restrict the employee’s right to use an alleged trade secret which is not 
such in fact or in law is unenforceable as against public policy.”); see also Deepa Varadarajan, The 
Trade Secret-Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 1587-90 (2018) (arguing that courts should 
limit enforcement of certain trade secret-related contract provisions in light of public policy 
concerns). To what extent IP owners should be able to use contract law to avoid doctrinal default 
rules is a topic beyond the scope of this Article but dealt with extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., 
Jonathan M. Barnett, Why Is Everyone Afraid of IP Licensing?, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (SPECIAL 
SYMPOSIUM) 123, 124-25 (2017); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of 
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 121-33 (1999); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing 
the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE 
L.J. 479 (1995); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: 
Reconciling Freedom of Contact with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999). 
289 See Graves, supra note 151, at 413-14. 
290 MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 15.02[1][a]. 
291 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Unpacking Trade Secret Damages, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 155, 195-96 
(2017) (observing empirical results showing that “a trade secret owner who prevails on damages is 
likely to also receive a permanent injunction”). 
292 547 U.S 388 (2006). 
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matter of course in patent disputes,293 a number of courts continue to presume 
that trade secret misappropriation produces irreparable harm and that 
successful plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an injunction.294 Some courts at 
least limit the duration of an injunction to the approximate length of time that 
independent development of the secret would have taken.295 Such head-start 
injunctions limit liability’s downside for cumulative innovation. One might 
need to wait to continue working on a particular line of research—and, to be 
clear, perhaps wait far longer than is socially optimal—but at least one need 
not abandon that research path altogether. Yet other courts treat perpetual 
injunctions as the default.296 In those cases, where liability means leaving the 
secret information alone indefinitely, abandonment is a real possibility. 
If courts are going to maintain the existing broad definition of use, they would 
need to swear off any such remedial presumptions (at least in cases involving 
inexact similarity). Otherwise, courts are going to reach outcomes like the one in 
Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino,297 where a departing employee tried to design around his 
former employer’s screw-manufacturing method and ended up permanently 
enjoined not only from using the secret but also from ever “competing in the 
market for single-screw compressor technology and products.”298 That employee 
genuinely had no choice but to find new problems to work on. 
Finally, even if perpetual injunctions are taken off the table, implementing 
a derivation framework exclusively through remedies would still suffer from the 
delay problem mentioned in the previous Section: a defendant could not get rid 
of a case early. Viewing the extra litigation costs and the risk-adjusted expected 
value of any sanctions ex ante, some would-be defendants would probably avoid 
activity that would have provided a net benefit to society. To be sure, lowering 
the odds of a high damages award would dampen potential plaintiffs’ interest in 
suing. But relying on that effect puts great pressure on courts to get the damages 
 
293 See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An 
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1983 (2016) (showing that after eBay, permanent injunctions 
were granted 72.5% of the time, while before eBay they were granted in almost all cases). 
294 See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691, 706 
(E.D. Va. 2012). 
295 See MILGRIM, supra note 27, § 15.02[1][d]. 
296 See, e.g., Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Axis Techs., LLC, 444 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. 
App. 2014) (discerning no trend “in favor of more limited ‘lead time’ injunctions” and suggesting 
that “the ‘usual equitable order’ in a trade secret misappropriation case is a perpetual injunction 
against the wrongdoer”); see also Microstrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 661 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553 
(E.D. Va. 2009) (demonstrating the difficulties that a defendant faces when seeking to dissolve a 
perpetual injunction in a trade secret case). 
297 905 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
298 Id. at 1235-36. 
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calculation right consistently.299 Erroneously high damages awards are 
sometimes bound to happen, and plaintiffs can always at least threaten to sue. 
However many potential defendants would be unwilling to test their luck when 
liability is uncertain, the number is probably much higher when liability is 
essentially guaranteed and the only uncertainty is the size of the sanctions they 
would be compelled to pay at the conclusion of litigation. 
C. Affirmative Defense 
A third option would, like the first, maintain the substantial derivation 
analysis as part of the liability stage, but structure it as an affirmative defense 
rather than part of the plaintiff ’s case. Under that approach, a defendant might 
defeat an otherwise-valid misappropriation claim by proving that the defendant 
used only immaterial aspects of the secret or used it solely to develop a different 
product or process for exploitation in a remote and unforeseeable market. 
Styling substantial derivation as a defense rather than as part of the 
underlying cause of action would most resemble the path that other IP 
regimes take to insulate defendants’ adaptive uses. Copyright law, as 
discussed above in Section II.A, handles intermediate copying of software 
through its fair use defense (although it excludes intermediate copying of 
artistic works in the prima facie infringement standard, before fair use ever 
enters the picture). And patent law, at least in theory though not so much in 
practice anymore, provides an experimental use defense to users merely 
trying to understand how an invention works underneath the hood.300 
IP family resemblances aside, however, we think that placing the burden 
on the defendant makes less sense here. For the factual inquiries that we’ve 
proposed, the plaintiff is the least-cost producer of the relevant evidence.301 
 
299 Cf. Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1059 (2016) 
(“Under strict liability a user’s preventive behavior is highly sensitive to consistently erroneous 
damage calculations by courts or to erroneous predictions about such calculations.”). 
300 But under modern doctrine, experimenting with a patented invention counts as an infringing 
use—even if done while attempting to improve the invention or design around it—so long as the user 
was commercially motivated. See Soitec, S.A. v. Silicon Genesis Corp., 81 F. App’x 734, 737 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Madey v. Duke 
Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (calling the experimental use defense “very narrow and 
limited to actions performed ‘for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
inquiry,’” while excluding any uses “in keeping with the legitimate business of the alleged infringer”). 
On the decline of the experimental use defense, see generally Strandburg, supra note 22. 
301 Cf. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1279 n.34 (11th Cir. 2014) (placing the 
burden on the plaintiffs to prove market harm in a fair use case because “where[] one party has all 
the evidence on a particular issue, . . . it is equitable to require that party to go forward with the 
evidence”); Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 707 (2015) 
(criticizing other decisions that treat copyright’s fair use doctrine as an affirmative defense, given 
that “the plaintiff typically is in a better position to provide evidence of the presence of harm to 
relevant markets if such harm exists”). 
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The defendant’s purpose or motivation doesn’t matter. Only outcomes do. It’s 
the trade secret owner, not the accused misappropriator, who is most likely to 
know what information was material to the original project and whether it or 
its industry peers foresaw the defendant’s commercial use. As a result, treating 
these questions as part of the “use” element, rather than a freestanding 
defense, should lead to more efficient adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
Every IP regime needs a plan for how to handle inexact similarity. Trade 
secrecy has made it a long time without much of one—probably longer than 
it reasonably should. But it can’t paper over that gap any longer, if indeed it 
ever could. A national innovation policy increasingly dependent on trade 
secret law cannot afford to treat all derivative uses the same. Too many 
lawsuits, industrial strategies, and individual employee decisions depend on 
courts enabling factfinders to distinguish the good from the bad. 
Fortunately, judges are in a good position to do something about it. The 
substantial derivation concept presupposes that some derivations are actually 
insubstantial. Factfinders just need to be able to identify them. To do that, they 
should start by focusing on the product or process that the defendant is actually 
exploiting. Any derivation should be deemed insubstantial if there is no feature 
of that asset that materially contributed to the protectability of the trade secret 
in the first place. And even when such a feature is present, the defendant’s use 
should still be excused if it is occurring solely in an unforeseeable market. 
Our proposal would change the way courts think about nonliteral 
similarity in trade secrecy cases. But it would do so using only the doctrinal 
tools courts already have. Those tools can build a business environment in 
which not all R&D inspirations are uses. Not all derivations are substantial. 
And not all similarities are wrong. 
 
